Barbaric mistakes: Western print media’s portrayal of “ethnic” conflicts by Roff, Katherine Louise
Barbaric mistakes: 





submitted in partial fulfilment 
of the requirements for the Degree of 













Recent literature has criticised the broad label of “ethnic conflict” applied to a spate of post-
Cold War violence and the international community’s response to such conflicts (see for 
example Tang, 2011; Franks, 2010; Ray, 2008; Terzis, 2008; Allen and Seaton, 1999; 
Jacquin-Serdal, 1998). Sharp criticism has also arisen concerning the way in which 
international media reports on these so-called “ethnic” wars (Walzer, 2004; Carruthers, 2004 
and 2011; Livingston, 2007; Anderson and Trembath, 2011). Many scholars have argued that 
the actors involved in ethnic conflicts are often simplified in mainstream media clichés and 
interventionist narratives (Orford, 2003; Thompson, 2007; Bantimaroudis and Kampanellou, 
2009).  
This study addressed the question: “Does Western media framing of different actors in ethnic 
conflict influence the likelihood of intervention being advocated in the media?” In order to 
answer this question, this study used a content analysis of USA, UK and Australian print 
media, and explored the media framing of conflicts in Rwanda, Kosovo, and East Timor. The 
study examined newspaper articles prior to intervention and, using Piers Robinson’s media 
framing model (2000), measured the quantity of “empathetic” and “distancing” coverage in 
relation to suggestions for intervention. 
The results of this study show that simplified representations of these complex conflicts often 
lead to a dangerous polarisation in Western media. Ethnic conflicts are discussed either within 
a “barbaric” frame, where readers are presented with well-defined heroes, victims and villains 
and are encouraged to support intervention; or with a “native” narrative, where the situation is 
reported as a distant problem between “squabbling tribes”, and the media consumer is 
encouraged to support non-intervention. 
 
Keywords: Intervention, humanitarian intervention, interventionist narratives, ethnic conflict, 
media, media framing, war reporting, empathy framing, distance framing, barbaric, 
primordial, war, genocide, Rwanda, Kosovo, East Timor, Timor Leste, hero, victim, villain. 
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    Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Since the end of the Cold War, international politics has shifted its focus from inter-state war 
to intra-state conflict. Violence appears to no longer pit state against state, but governments 
against insurgents, and ethnic group against ethnic group. When civil war erupted in the 
1990s in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, East Timor and the Solomon Islands – to name a few – 
the conflicts were understood in the international arena as “ethnic” conflicts: violence arising 
from deep-rooted, ethnic animosity between rival groups. This “ethnic hatred” framework 
quickly became the prevalent explanation for conflicts around the world during this time 
(Iordanova, 2001: 829; see also Crawford and Lipschutz, eds, 1998; Allen and Seaton, 1999).  
Coupled with this shift was the rise of “humanitarian intervention”, the use of military force 
in other states to provide aid and protect human rights. The emerging norm of humanitarian 
intervention into ethnic conflicts, and its supposed contradiction to the protection of sovereign 
states, has been much debated in international politics and academia. Some politicians and 
scholars support intervention as upholding human rights, pointing to the Responsibility to 
Protect doctrine (see for example Dowden, 2004: 283), while others criticise intervention, 
referring to the United Nations charter’s protection of state borders (see for example 
Kuperman, 2008; Dinnen, 2008).  Regardless of the academic debate, humanitarian 
intervention has occurred in many conflicts, with a range of perceived successes and failures. 
The 1992-93 US-led intervention into the conflict in Somalia is widely referred to as a 
“debacle” and raised concern for interveners ability to keep missions on-task – the popular 
political phrase “crossing the Mogadishu line” sprung from the US involvement in Somalia 
and refers to the consequences of becoming too involved in intervention (Clarke and Herbst, 
1996: 70; see also Clark, 1993). Humanitarian intervention into East Timor and the Solomon 
Islands were, on the other hand, understood as more successful and, in the case of East Timor, 
even criticised for being overdue (Kuperman, 1999; Cotton, 2001; Ponzio, 2005). Reactions 
to interventions into Bosnia and Kosovo remain divided (Kempf, 1999; McGwire, 2000), 
while the international community’s failure to intervene in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda has 
been widely criticised (Kuperman, 2000b; Dowden, 2004). With such mixed reviews, it is 
little wonder that humanitarian intervention has provided rich fodder for academic studies, 
particularly in political and media studies. 
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Media’s role in intervention also remains a cause of much debate. Some scholars argue that 
media greatly influences domestic and foreign policies, while others suggest that media acts 
as a mouth-piece for political elites, and many propose that the relationship is more complex 
(for media and government relationships see Hallin, 1986; Bennett, 1990; Livingston and 
Eachus, 1995; Livingston, 2005). Media studies concerning humanitarian intervention, 
specifically, have focused mainly on the use of “framing” (see Entman, 1993 and 2004; 
Robinson, 2000; Carruthers, 2011 and 2000; Hawkins, 2011). Framing refers to a constant 
process of selection and exclusion in representation of the nature of the conflict, the conflict’s 
actors and the conflict’s relevant moral issues (Entman, 2004: 5). This study is based within 
these debates, and further expands the field of analysis of media framing of intervention. 
1.2 Thesis 
This study focused on the Western media frames used to represent recent ethnic conflicts in 
the lead up to humanitarian intervention. It critiqued the way in which three specific conflicts 
were portrayed in international media; the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, the US-led intervention 
in Kosovo and the Australian-led intervention in East Timor. This study explored the framing 
used to discuss the violence in all three examples of “ethnic” conflict, and the impact such 
framing had on suggestions made for or against international intervention in Western media. 
1.3  Literature Review 
In order to contextualise this study, a literature review was conducted to explore existing 
theories on Western media portrayals of intervention in ethnic conflict. Within media 
representations of ethnic violence and subsequent intervention into the conflict, several 
theories have emerged concerning the role of “heroes”, “victims” and “villains” (see 
Wolfsfeld, 1997; Iordanova, 2001; Orford, 2003; Thompson, 2007). Western media has been 
accused of relying on these stereotypes and clichés in the representation of ethnic conflict 
(Allen and Seaton, 1999; Orford, 2003; Barkawi, 2004). This study examined the extent to 
which media frames of heroes, victims and villains were utilised in portrayals of the conflict 
in Rwanda, Kosovo and East Timor. It also explored the narratives used in Western media 
when clearly defined characters were not present in media coverage of a conflict. Scholars 
have argued that a lack of clear binary opposition in ethnic conflicts has led to reduced 
interest by policy makers, the media and the public (see Jacquin-Serdal, 1998; Fein, 2000; 
Shaw, 2011; Thompson, 2007). This study explored the hypothesis that some conflicts are 
 3 
ignored or misunderstood because of the inability for Western media to identify traditional 
hero/victim/villain narratives. 
Literature has highlighted a distinction between ethnic conflicts which are identified as 
“barbaric” situations, and those which are deemed “native” problems. It has been proposed 
that “barbaric” ethnic conflicts are framed as a violation of human rights, with clear victims 
and villains, and are portrayed as worthy of intervention (Fernández-Armesto, 2001; 
Iordanova, 2001; Orford, 2003). “Native” conflicts, on the other hand are often represented as 
confusing battles between primitive people, and are distanced from the Western reader as 
conflicts better left alone (Thompson, 2007; Fowler and Sarkin, 2010).  
1.4 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This study sought to answer the question: “Does Western media framing of different actors 
in ethnic conflict influence the likelihood of intervention being advocated in the media?” 
This question, given the theories explained in the literature review, evolved into the following 
hypotheses:  
1) When ethnic conflicts are framed as “barbaric” situations (involving heroes, victims 
and villains), intervention is promoted in the media.  
2) When ethnic conflicts are framed as “native” situations (stemming from ancient 
hatreds), at least one of the three players – heroes, victims or villains – is missing, and 
intervention is not promoted.  
In testing these hypotheses, insights were also attained by addressing the following sub 
questions: 
1) What media frames are used to represent “barbaric” conflicts, and how do they compare 
to the frames used for “native” conflicts? 
2) What kind of media frames lead to the promotion of international intervention into ethnic 
conflicts, and what kind correlate with support for non-intervention? 
3) Do the media frames used to represent ethnic conflicts differ, depending on the geographic 
location of the conflict, or the geographic location of the news in which they appear? 
4) Why are some ethnic conflicts depicted as barbaric (and warranting intervention) and 
some as native (and not worthy of intervention)? 
The next section discusses the methodology used to answer these questions. 
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1.5 Methodology 
A content analysis was conducted of Western media coverage prior to the genocide in 
Rwanda, the intervention into Kosovo and the intervention into East Timor. Using Piers 
Robinson’s empathy and distance framing model (2000) as a basis, a comparison of these 
three very different conflicts identified patterns in the type of coverage the conflicts received. 
More importantly, the empathy/distance model enabled a direct comparison of the kind of 
coverage individual parties involved in the conflict received. To Robinson’s model, this study 
added the variables of different “characters” or “actors” in the conflict (such as “heroes”, 
“victims” and “villains”) for analysis. For example: were the East Timorese portrayed as 
victims in a similar way to the Kosovo Albanians, or to the Rwandan Tutsi people? Were the 
Indonesian military, Serbian authorities or Hutu militia identified as villains? Did the West 
and its role as a potential hero come into play?  Finally, the content analysis allowed an 
assessment of the relationship between the framing of the actors involved in the conflict and 
suggestions made for international intervention. 
While most media studies of this nature have so far focused on US newspapers, this study 
compared coverage in leading US, UK and Australian newspapers. The Times in London, the 
New York Times and the Sydney Morning Herald were all reviewed, sampling 50 articles from 
each paper during the prelude of each conflict. Media studies to date have also largely focused 
on reporting during conflict, ignoring the framing of conflicts prior to international 
intervention. This study explored media coverage before potential foreign intervention, 
examining the framing of the conflict and the way in which the option of intervention is 
presented. 
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    Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
This study investigates how conflicts are understood in the lead up to intervention, and what 
frameworks are used to portray them to the wider international community. Political and 
academic literature in the fields of humanitarian intervention, just war theory, media and 
conflict, and media framing is extensive and this study draws on elements from each. The 
following literature review provides a brief overview of the political context of intervention; 
critiques existing “ethnic conflict” literature; examines previous research into media’s role in 
conflict; and explores media’s specific role in representing different actors in “ethnic” 
conflicts. 
2.1 Political Paradigm 
Sovereignty So Far 
Modern international relations have, since the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, 
been based on the concept of the sovereign nation (Zartman, 2010: 3). Contemporary 
international law has established support for the protection of sovereign rights, with the UN 
Charter stating that members should refrain from threatening the “territorial integrity” or 
“political independence” of another state (article 2.4). However, since the end of the Cold 
War, inter-state wars have given way to intra-state conflicts, with increasing political focus on 
military action in “humanitarian intervention” (Mednicoff, 2006: 373; Fein, 2000: 49; 
Kuperman, 2004: 314). Humanitarian intervention is defined in this study as “the use of 
military force in other states to halt human rights abuses or otherwise promote human rights” 
(Heinze, 2006: 20). The UN Charter, despite protecting nation-states, has been interpreted by 
some international lawyers and theorists as making an exception to state sovereignty in the 
case of widespread human rights violation (Wheeler, 2000: 2). This interpretation is largely 
based on the Responsibility to Protect document, released in 2001 by the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which outlines the duty of other nations 
to intervene in states where mass atrocities are occurring (Thakur and Weiss, 2009: 22; 
Fowler and Sarkin, 2010: 1). This exception to the general rule of non-intervention is a sub-
set of one of the largest contemporary political debates: whether or not there exists a case for 
justified war (Slaughter-Burley et al, 1994: 18; Goodman, 2006: 107).  
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The argument between upholding a state’s sovereign right and the need to intervene to protect 
individual human rights has emerged from a much wider paradigm which focuses on “just 
war” theory. Early theorists, such as the Christian scholars Thomas Aquinas and Augustine, 
debated the possibility of virtuous war (Miller, 2002: 174), as did the influential Dominican 
friar Francisco de Vitoria in the sixteenth century (1991: 303) and Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius 
in the seventeenth-century (Goodman, 2006: 107; Holzgrefe and O’Keohane, 2003: 26). The 
debate raised by these scholars, and numerous others, has led to the creation of the Charter of 
the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Responsibility to 
Protect document (Kuperman 2008: 49). However, as long as state sovereignty remains the 
foundation of international relations, intervention of any kind will be examined under scrutiny 
(Slaughter-Burley et al, 1994: 28), and the concept of humanitarian intervention has been 
heavily criticised in theory and practice (Kuperman, 2008: 49; Rieff 2002: 112; Williams and 
Bellamy, 2006; Bilder, 1969: 173; Weiss, 2001: 20).  
Exceptions for “Barbarians” 
An important classic political theorist whose ideas are often not considered in the 
humanitarian intervention debate is John Stuart Mill. One early line of thinking in which 
humanitarian intervention was proposed as a legitimate exception to non-intervention was in 
Mill’s 1859 work A Few Words on Non-Intervention. Mill argued against sovereign states 
intervening in each other’s affairs but believed in an exception to that rule in the case of 
“barbarians” (1984a: 119). Mill believed that nations deemed “barbarous” would only benefit 
from being “conquered and held in subjection by foreigners” (1984a: 119) and divided the 
world into civilised and uncivilised nations (2006: 257). Mill defined “barbarians” as having 
limited capabilities, a lack of homogenous national sentiment and an inability to reciprocate in 
international agreements (2006: 259). He rejected his usual doctrine of non-intervention in the 
case of dealing with barbarians, and claimed that intervening in the case of barbaric nations is 
likely to be for their own benefit (Mill, 2006: 259). Mill argued that “barbarous nations” had 
no rights as a nation, except the right to strive towards becoming a “civilised” nation with 
legitimate status (Mill, 2006: 259). The writings of Mill and other classic political theorists 
may seem extreme in a contemporary context; however the distinction between “civilised” 
and “barbaric” nations has resonated throughout international relations since Mill’s original 
writings. 
Some contemporary scholars have argued that Mill identified problems which are intrinsic 
and timeless in international relations (Prager, 2005: 621). Indeed, Mill’s justifications for 
intervention can be identified in recent political rhetoric. Western leaders’ prolific use of the 
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words “uncivilised” and “barbaric” in defence of recent military interventions is well-
documented (Kuusisto, 1999; Fernández-Armesto, 2001: 1; Iordanova, 2001: 828). US 
Generals and the former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pointed to “barbaric” acts in 
Iraq to justify a US presence (World News Today, 2010), former British prime minister Tony 
Blair spoke of action in Kosovo as “saving civilisation” (Kuusisto, 1999; Fernández-Armesto, 
2001: 1; Iordanova, 2001: 828), and representatives in East Timor justified an Australian 
intervention into the “barbaric” situation there (Lateline, 1999). While Mill was referring to 
whole cultures as barbaric, the more recent examples have focused on a specific government 
or leader and their actions as barbaric. However, it is important to note that while the context 
and application has changed, the rhetoric has remained the same – as has the cultural 
supremacy and perceived right to overpower “barbarians”. Law professor Anne Orford 
suggested in her work that international law portrays the need to intervene in other states as a 
way to “protect and look after the people of ‘failed states’” (2003: 11). She argued that this 
attitude, and the forms of dependence set up in post-conflict ‘peace-building’ situations, seem 
to “rehearse colonial fantasies about the need for benevolent tutelage of uncivilised people 
who were as yet unable to govern themselves” (2003: 11). The advocacy of “civilised” 
cultures intervening in “barbaric” ones is not exclusive to the colonial era; the assumption of 
supremacy continues to exist in intervention rhetoric today.  
While intervention against “barbarism” may have roots in the desire to help others, its 
application often leaves much to be desired (Weiss, 2001: 20; Kuperman, 2008: 49). Even 
when humanitarian intervention is accepted in theory, it is thwarted by unenforceable 
international law and inconsistencies in its implementation (Holzgrefe and O’Keohane 2003: 
15). It is also heavily dependent on domestic politics – something that appears to be largely 
overlooked in theories focusing on international law. Some academics and politicians have 
argued that intervention could have saved hundreds of thousands of lives in situations such as 
Rwanda (Dowden, 2004: 283), and did save lives in Bosnia. However, others have suggested 
that humanitarian intervention may in fact be counter-productive – leaving situations worse 
than they would be without intervention (Kuperman, 2008: 75). A dependency on 
international forces in post-conflict stages has been heavily condemned, and the emerging 
norm of humanitarian intervention has been criticised for triggering and emboldening 
rebellion from non-state actors (Kuperman, 2008: 75). Others have further argued that 
economic, political and trade interventions prior to military humanitarian intervention are 
overlooked in the wake of humanitarian crises (Crawford and Lipschutz, eds, 1998; Orford, 
2003). This study investigates how conflicts are represented and understood in this time 
period – the lead up to a potential military intervention. 
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The “Ethnic” Conflict Framework 
The “ethnic hatred” framework that became the prevalent explanation for conflicts in the 
1990s has been labelled a misleading one (Bowen, 1996: 3; Crawford and Lipschutz, eds, 
1998; Allen and Seaton, 1999; Iordanova, 2001: 829). Academics have disputed what “ethnic 
conflict” is and whether conflicts labelled “ethnic” are truly ethnic in nature. Part of the 
criticism of political studies that focus on ethnic conflict lies in the shifting definitions of the 
term “ethnicity”. Hale argues in his work, Explaining Ethnicity, that although scholars often 
regard “ethnicity” as an important phenomenon in politics, “nothing close to a consensus has 
emerged about not only what its effects are but also what it is” (2004: 258). The concept of 
“ethnicity” is ambiguous and difficult to define (Allen, 1999: 28; Grosfoguel, 2004: 1; Hale, 
2004: 459). In this context, the broad label of “ethnic” conflict becomes problematic in 
political literature.   
Anthony Smith, one of the leading academics in the study of nationalism, criticised the 
conventional view of ethnic groups as “homogeneous, stable and enduring communities” 
(2009: 41). Shortcomings in previous studies conducted on ethnic conflicts stem from the 
assumption that ethnic groups are monolithic, when in reality ethnic groups have internal 
divisions, and are not permanent concepts (Kuperman 2004: 348; see also Anderson, 1991). E 
thnicity, from an anthropological point of view, is a “fluid” entity, a concept that is 
“negotiated”, rather than stagnant and permanent (Allen, 1999: 28). Political economist David 
Keen surmised that because “ethnic” conflicts are often framed as having “historic causes”, a 
region’s violent history “seduces us into accepting ethnic divisions as fixed and inevitable” 
(1999: 90).  
Many academics have also criticised the assumption that “ethnic” wars stem from ancient 
hatreds and deep-rooted, irreconcilable differences (see Crawford and Lipschutz, eds, 1998; 
Allen and Seaton eds, 1999; Orford: 2003; Ray, 2008; Terzis, 2008; Tang, 2011). Long-term 
observers have suggested that the misguided understanding of ethnicity has led to inaccurate 
interpretations of conflicts, such as those in former Yugoslavia (Glenny, 1992; Bowen, 1996: 
3; Allen and Seaton, 1999). Ethnic tensions were portrayed as the cause of the violence when 
the crisis was “equally a product of modern capitalist international relations” (Orford, 2003: 
12). Behind the “ethnic war” claims were political and economic battles between world 
powers. Professor Tim Allen warned of the dangers of using ethnicity as a straightforward 
explanation of war and suggested that ethnic explanations of conflicts target social groups as 
“inherently pre-disposed to violence”, and that this contrasts “their primal barbarity” with 
“our humanitarianism” (Allen and Seaton,1999: 31). 
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Despite growing academic concerns for the broad application of the “ethnic conflict” label, 
recent outbreaks of violence have been attributed to ancient ethnic rivalries, rather than 
considering the wider context in which conflict exists. Rhetoric employed by Western powers 
to justify recent interventions has often included the terms “barbaric” or “failed”. For 
example, humanitarian intervention in the Solomon Islands in 2003 was portrayed in the news 
as a necessary response to a “state failure” (Wainwright, 2003: 145). Ten years prior to 
intervention into East Timor, Roman Catholic Bishop Carlos Belo accused the Indonesian 
government of human rights abuses and described the system as “barbaric” (New York 
Times, 22 January 1989). Ann Wigglesworth of Caritas described the suffering in East Timor 
later as “so barbaric”, “so inhuman” and claimed it was “difficult to understand how human 
beings can act like that” (Lateline, 1999). Similarly, the United States Commission on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe declared that a particular massacre in Kosovo prior to 
intervention was “barbaric” and that the violence was the responsibility of Serbian leader 
Slobodan Milosevic (Helsinki Commission News, 1999). 
The Exception to the Exception 
The descriptions of failed states and barbaric situations, while arguably correct, classify the 
nations involved as “exceptions” to the non-intervention political theory. However, if ethnic 
violence involving barbarism is, as previous literature suggests, usually framed as a situation 
warranting international intervention, then what happened in Rwanda?  In 1994, Belgian 
Peacekeepers were withdrawn from Kigali, Rwanda, during the onset of genocide, contrary to 
expectations that developed nations would intervene in such situations (Clark, 2005: 115). 
The conflict in Rwanda was portrayed in Western media as “confusing” and not worthy of 
international intervention, despite the genocide occurring there (Thompson, 2007: 160; 
Fowler and Sarkin, 2010: 14, 15). It was not until the worst of the genocide was over that the 
international community considered intervention (Kuperman, 2000b: 98; Fowler and Sarkin, 
2010: 2). Why such an event went unrecognised, or was ignored, for so long is a question that 
has plagued political theorists, but one explanation lies in a justification identifiable in Mill’s 
work: the exception to the exception. 
After discussing the legitimate intervention into “barbaric” situations, Mill went on to express 
an opportunity to refuse to intervene in so-called “native” conflicts – an attitude that also 
appears prevalent in contemporary political discourse. Mill argued, in his 1859 essay, against 
intervention when the contest is “only with native rulers, and with such native strength as 
those rulers can enlist in their defence” (2006: 262). He believed that in such a case there was 
little assurance that intervention, even if successful, would be for the good of the people 
 10 
(2006: 262), and adopted a ‘let-them-fight-it-out-amongst-themselves’ approach to “native” 
battles. Mill suggested that a nation devoid of freedom and democracy must look to its own 
people to overthrow despotic leaders, rather than international intervention. This Darwinian 
approach to understanding foreign conflicts has permeated international relations since Mill’s 
time. 
In 1989 political scientist Francis Fukuyama released an essay labelled The end of History?, a 
work that reflected Mill’s attitude towards leaving “native” conflicts alone. Fukuyama argued 
that a liberal democratic state was the ultimate goal to which a “civilised” nation could aspire 
(1989). This, in turn, implied that states embroiled in ethnic wars were “uncivilised” and had 
not reached their full potential, or legitimately exercised their full rights, as a nation state. 
Fukuyama highlighted political views of the time in his description of civil and tribal wars as 
“ancient conflicts” and believed that “clearly, the vast bulk of the Third World remains very 
much mired in history, and will be a terrain of conflict for many years to come” (1989). 
Fukuyama’s dismissal of conflicts in the third world as seemingly necessary battles on the 
road to evolution, while controversial in the academic world, offers an insight into a popular 
opinion held regarding intervention. While Fukuyama has since reassessed his views, 
particularly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA, his theory on non-intervention is 
evident in the international reaction to several other conflicts. 
The suggestion that the West should not intervene in complex conflicts in far-away countries 
can be recognised in much of the international political rhetoric concerning refusals to 
intervene (Keen, 1999: 82). Attributing the cause of a conflict to “ethnicity” has become a 
way of “laying not just entire blame, but responsibility for the entire circumstances at the door 
of the natives” (Fardon, 1999: 76). Primordial explanations of wars identified as “native” 
ethnic conflicts attribute conflict to “ancient hatreds” and ingrained ethnic differences 
(Crawford and Lipschutz, 1998: 200; Livingston and Euachas, 2000). This understanding 
suggests that “little can be done” and that others are encouraged to feel that the best solution 
is to “stand aside” (Fardon, 1999: 76). Former British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd stated 
that in particular cases it is “perfectly defensible” for the international community to “stay out 
of the way until those concerned have come to their senses” (as quoted in Keen, 1999: 82). 
Clearly, Mill’s interpretation of how to deal with “native” conflicts foreshadowed future 
thinking, and examples of calls to resist intervention in so-called “ethnic” battles continue in 
contemporary political arguments. 
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2.2 Media Matters 
Media’s Role in Conflict 
The media industry has been the focus of many studies for its role in conflict (see Livingston, 
1997 and 2011; Carruthers, 2000; Hawkins, 2002; Wolfsfeld, 2004; Fowler and Sarkin, 
2010). Political philosopher Michael Walzer argued that “it may be possible to kill people on 
a very large scale more efficiently than ever before, but it is much harder to kill them in 
secret” (2002: 29). With modern communication technologies allowing rapid media response 
to catastrophes, theorists are constantly investigating the influence this can have on a nation’s 
foreign policy. This impact, labelled the “CNN effect”, was extensively explored in the 1990s 
by leading scholars Steven Livingston and Piers Robinson, with Livingston defining the CNN 
effect broadly as the “idea that media attention to distant crises can trigger policy responses” 
(2007: 188; for a full description see Livingston, 1997 and Livingston and Eachus, 1995). 
This study does not wade into the CNN effect, however, it could be used as the first part of a 
CNN effect study, as it examines the media framing of conflicts.  
Amongst the criticism of media behaviour, and media studies, lays Peter Jakobsen’s argument 
that academic focus on conflict media “misses the point” (2000). Following Livingston’s 
definitions of the CNN effect, Jakobsen argued that global media fails to take an interest in 
conflicts in their pre-violence phase, ignoring “simmering” problems and focusing only on 
sensational events. Much of the academic criticism of war reporting stems from this ‘in-and-
out’ nature of coverage, which is also labelled “parachute journalism” (Hultman, 1992; also 
see Allen and Seaton, 1999; Thompson, 2007: 161). US media in particular, is critiqued for 
reporting international affairs in a “fleeting, ephemeral and all too typically frivolous” manner 
(Livingston, 2007: 189). Allen and Seaton argue that reporting has become, with new 
technologies in the media, less insightful and more sensationalist (1999; also see Iordanova, 
2001: 830). Academic studies too, have been criticised for their focus on the violent stages of 
conflict, rather than the pre- and post-violent stages (Gilboa, 2010: 93), which is one of the 
reasons this study focuses on the stages prior to intervention.  
Media Framing of Humanitarian Intervention and “Ethnic” Conflict 
Frames enable journalists to “package” large amounts of information into more readily 
accessible stories for domestic audiences (Gitlin, 1980: 7). Journalists rely on cognitive 
recognition from their readers/viewers, regularly using culturally familiar “frames” in order to 
quickly convey an understanding of the conflict (Wolfsfeld 1997: 33). “Framing” can be 
further defined as “selecting some aspects of a perceived reality [to] make them more salient 
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in a communicating text” (Entman, 1993: 52). In the context of international conflict 
reporting, this means getting a clear, succinct story across to audiences who may not be 
educated in the complexities of the situation. Journalists react to specific events in the field 
and “look for the best narrative fit” (Wolfsfeld; 1997: 35). This reliance on frames, and the 
selection process involved, has seen media’s role in conflict critiqued as both influential and 
one with important consequences. 
The way in which media frames conflict has an impact on the way the public perceive the 
need for intervention. Scholars have argued that media images of suffering, and the “frames” 
presented in news stories, are able to mobilise public sentiment (Orford, 2003; Robinson, 
1999; Wolfsfeld, 1997:56 - 73). Media representations of past and present wars can 
“strengthen or corrode the public willingness to support foreign adventures” (Barkawi, 2004: 
115), and therefore framing can potentially influence a government’s decision to intervene in 
another nation. The measure of this influence is, however, as previously mentioned, much 
debated (see Hallin, 1986; Bennett, 1990; Livingston, 1997 and 2007; Fowler and Sarkin, 
2010: 9).  
Sharp criticism has arisen concerning the way in which international media views “ethnic” 
conflicts specifically (Rosel, 1997: 145; Said, 2001: 146; Kuperman, 2004: 314), and scholars 
have suggested that conflicts involving ethnic groups are over-simplified in mainstream media 
frames (Hayden, 1996: 783; Allen and Seaton, 1999; Bantimaroudis and Kampanellou, 2009: 
171, 186). Part of the problem lies in media’s general coverage of war itself. Communications 
analyst Gadi Wolfsfeld argued that one of the questions news people, while perhaps not 
consciously asking themselves, seek to answer in their attempts to understand and frame 
conflict is “Who are the good guys?” (1997: 49). He argued that the nature of conflict 
journalism encourages reporters to find “fault” with one side of the war, usually through 
identifying “victims” (1997: 53). Wolfsfeld’s identification of the hero/victim narrative in 
conflict media compliments Orford’s work concerning humanitarian intervention and 
contributes to the growing literature discussing the way in which media frames ethnic wars. 
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2.3 Heroes, Victims and Villains: Interventionist Narratives 
“…we do prefer to keep our crises simple, stories with a definable 
beginning and a predictable end. We like our villains to be foreign 
and our heroes home-grown.”           (Ted Koppel, Nightline, 1994) 
The Hero 
Orford provided an insightful perspective on intervention as part of a “familiar heroic 
narrative” in her work Reading Humanitarian Intervention (2003: 158). She argued that a 
hero/victim narrative is often portrayed in Western media in order to justify intervention, and 
that this narrative often masks real power relations in the conflict (2003: 158, 159, 171). 
Orford’s work is part of a limited, but growing, field of feminist, Marxist and post-colonialist 
critiques in international relations which deal with the issue of identity (see also Morrison, 
1992; Kaplan, 1997). Orford argued that legal texts dealing with intervention allow and 
promote a powerful construction of a “hero” role for the international community (2003: 159). 
She concluded that this “heroic” narrative has stemmed from an imperialist era, when the 
hero/victim paradigm “governed encounters between Europe, later the ‘West’ or the 
‘international community’, and those colonised or enslaved by Europeans” (2003: 161). Even 
in an era of decolonisation, the role of the hero is primed for the “civilised, white West” to 
intervene in other, “darker” and more “barbaric” nations (Morrison, 1992: 44). Serious 
concerns have been raised for the “imperial” and “patriarchal” attitude of humanitarian 
intervention discourse, and the media in which it is legitimised (Orford, 2003: 37). 
Scholars have identified this “heroic” narrative in media framing of intervention, specifically 
within coverage of the international community’s involvement in the Kosovo and East Timor 
conflicts (Orford, 2003: 35; Wolfsfeld, 1997; Iordanova, 2001: 828; Kuusisto, 1999). Orford 
argued that media reports widely promoted the image of NATO as a “protector” of Kosovar 
Albanians from Serbian ethnic cleansing (169). The intervention into Kosovo was, indeed, 
described by Tony Blair as an act in defence of “civilisation” (Fernández-Armesto, 2001: 1). 
Similarly, prior to intervention into East Timor, Australian Prime Minister John Howard 
described the situation as “deplorable” and said that “innocent people” had “insufficient 
protection” (Lateline, 1999). Such justifications offer a narrative in which the international 
community “rescues those passive victims who suffer at the hands of bullies and tyrants” 
(Orford, 2003: 35). This construction of the international community as a “white knight” 
coming to rescue victims of humanitarian crises not only requires the role of the “hero”, but 
also the characters defined as “helpless victims” (Orford, 2003). 
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The Victim 
Orford claimed that the humanitarian intervention narrative often produces images of people 
who live in states targeted for intervention as “starving, powerless, suffering, abused or 
helpless victims” in need of rescue (2003: 174). Since World War II, images of the ‘third 
world’ have solidified an impression of poverty and helplessness in the wake of global 
development (Escobar, 1995). Legal scholar Patricia Williams has identified descriptions of 
people of states in Africa, Asia, South America and Eastern Europe as “childlike”, 
“primitive”, “barbaric” or “unable to govern themselves” (1995: 204-5), and she has 
highlighted a divide between the “civilised” hero and “barbaric” victims. Professor Sinclair 
Dinnen argued that intervention missions are usually “derived from ‘western’ blue-prints 
about how states are supposed to work”, implying a superiority of the West over other, lesser 
states (2008: 339). This notion of West superiority in intervention literature and law is not 
new, Mill and his contemporaries assumed such a role, and the colonial era relied on this 
attitude – one which Orford labelled a “hierarchy of race” (2003: 174). 
The role of the “victim” in media framing of ethnic conflict, and the empathy it produces in 
readers, was extensively explored by Robinson (2000, 2002). Robinson’s description of 
victims was used in the methodology of this study and his method of identifying such frames 
is further discussed in the next section of this review, which explores empathy and distance 
framing. 
The Villain 
If the victim and hero are well-established roles in humanitarian intervention discourse, who 
is playing the part of the villain? Walzer argued that intervention rhetoric is “extremely 
dependent on the victim/victimizer, good guys/bad guys model” and claimed that forceful 
intervention may not be politically possible without it (2004: 71). Walzer criticised the UN’s 
initial “weakness” in Bosnia as a failure to successfully identify the “bad guys” involved, 
therefore failing to justify a more forceful intervention earlier in the conflict (2004: 71, also 
see Iordanova, 2001: 828). However, the role of the “bad guy” lacks sufficient academic 
investigation. Image theorists have conducted thorough research into the way a nation’s media 
frames an “enemy” to its public (see Ottosen 1995; Alexander et al: 2005; Merskin 2004; 
Steuter and Wills, 2010; Bahador, 2012), but less research has been conducted concerning 
images of an aggressor in humanitarian crises. While previous literature has covered the need 
for heroes and victims in an interventionist narrative, this study extends the theory to reveal 
the importance of an identifiable “villain” prior to humanitarian intervention.  
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2.4 It’s Just the Natives 
A Dangerous Story 
So, what happens when the ethnic conflict in question does not neatly fall into the 
hero/victim/villain framework? When violence does not present two clearly-defined sides, the 
default framing is that of an “eruption of mindless violence”, often stemming from “ancient 
tribal hatreds” (Keen: 1999, 81). This framing is different to the “barbaric” frames mentioned 
earlier, in that there is no “tyrant that needs removing” or “victim group that requires rescue” 
(Walzer, 2004: 70). Instead, there appears a framing of “native conflict”, a primitive battle too 
difficult for the Western world to understand, let alone intervene in. 
This framing of native battles better left to “sort it out themselves” is evidence of Mill’s 
attitude appearing in contemporary politics. Mill’s suggestion that “native” conflicts should 
be left well alone reoccurs in justifications for non-intervention in situations such as Rwanda 
and early Bosnia – cases that are put in the ‘too hard basket’ for Western nations to 
understand and intervene in, due to their “ancient” and “deep-rooted” hatreds. Fowler and 
Sarkin showed in their work that the “ancient enmity” frame discouraged the international 
community from taking any sort of action in Rwanda (2010: 15). Political analysts Fowler 
and Sarkin suggested that this frame implies – as Mill initially proposed – that the hatred 
between two groups is “rooted so deeply that no intervention from the West could ever 
improve relations between the groups” (2010: 15). Sociologist Stanley Cohen noted that if 
media present a country's violence as “just another episode in a centuries-long Darwinian 
struggle for power, a twist in the endless cycle of retaliation which is beyond any imaginable 
solution, then bystander ‘passivity’ is hardly surprising” (2001: 177). 
Africa: Left in the Dark 
“Having been carved up and colonized by European powers and 
turned into pawns, knights and rooks on a cold war chessboard by the 
superpowers, Africa now faces a devastating new problem: 
indifference.”   (Stephen Holmes, New York Times, 1993) 
Many scholars and journalists have criticised the lack of media focus on African news in 
general, and African conflicts in particular (Livingston, 2007; Anderson and Trembath, 2011; 
Allen and Seaton, 1999; Kuperman, 2000a; Hawkins, 2008 and 2011). A 2008 content 
analysis of media articles from the New York Times showed that the volume of news 
coverage Africa received had increased since 1996 but also showed that “crisis” news 
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remained the predominant type of coverage (Osunde and Tlou, 1996; Danker-Dake, 2008). A 
large portion of the cause of this neglect lies in news values. The sensationalist nature of 
conflict media complies with the dominant values used to select “newsworthy” stories in the 
mainstream editorial process: immediacy, drama, simplicity and ethnocentricity (Kolstø, 
2009:27). Editors and journalists are trained to focus on conflicts and events which impact on 
their readership, with African conflicts often understood as removed from the reality of the 
West.  
Anderson and Trembath compiled a thorough history of Australian conflict reporting and 
argued that coverage of Africa is “predisposed to cultural assumptions that life there is held 
more cheaply than in the West” (2011: 283). They observed that mass atrocities are usually 
associated with the non-Western world and they acknowledge the higher news value placed 
on Western individuals (2011: 283). The idea that news values favour localised and 
ethnocentric stories is not a revelation, and the concept has been extensively analysed (see for 
example Beaudoin and Thorson, 2001; Gans, 2004; Anderson and Trembath, 2011; Chang et 
al, 2012). This study acknowledges the well-documented lack of African news that has 
dogged past media sources and goes on to explore the quality of reporting concerning Africa.  
The Tale of Two Tribes 
In no place else is the framing of ethnic conflicts as “native” squabbles more obvious than in 
coverage of Africa. Mainstream media, in particular, has been condemned for its erroneous 
reporting of African wars (see Morrison, 1992; Styan, 1999; Hawkins, 2008; Danker-Dake, 
2008; Fowler and Sarkin, 2010). Sociologist Martin Shaw argued that in cases such the 1994 
genocide in Rwanda, the media found the politics at the time even more difficult to deal with 
than Kurdistan or Bosnia, and could “only describe the conflict in ethnic terms” (1996: 172). 
Media coverage of a complex situation reduced it to “simple ethnic categories” (Shaw, 1996: 
173) and reduced the situation to fighting between two “tribes” (Philo, 1998: 50). A reporter 
‘on the ground’ during the Rwandan genocide, Mark Doyle, admitted that there is a “general 
tendency to portray Africa as chaotic, the Dark Continent” (Thompson, 2007: 154), and noted 
that part of Western media’s dilemma with identifying the genocide before it was too late was 
because the organised attacks “didn’t really fit the media image of chaotic Africa” 
(Thompson, 2007: 154).  
Many reports on the Rwandan conflict discussed the “wild” or “mad” nature of the people 
involved (Philo, 1998: 50; Carruthers, 2004: 164) and the terms “tribe”, “ethnicity” and often 
references to Joseph Conrad’s fiction novel Heart of Darkness were frequently elided together 
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(Allen, 1999: 31). For example, when conflict in Rwanda was peaking in 1994, Washington 
Post columnist Richard Cohen titled one of his articles “Tribalism: the Human Heart of 
Darkness”, arguing that such violence could not occur in the United States (April 21, 1994, as 
in Fowler and Sarkin, 2010: 187). The “them” and “us” approach to African conflict has seen 
media representations distance Western readers (Fowler and Sarkin, 2010: 187; Anderson and 
Trembath, 2011: 263, 282; Shaw, 2012: 86), and this study seeks to directly compare the 
framing of “ethnic” conflict in Africa to “ethnic” conflict in other parts of the world. 
2.5 Empathy vs. Distance Framing 
“The bottom line is that wars are things which happen to non-Western 
people, not to us.”                                              Martin Shaw (1996: 8) 
Previous studies of media framing have identified two different framing models, those which 
empathise and those which distance (Robinson, 2000; see also Preston, 1996; Shaw, 1996 and 
2012). Robinson used the empathy/distance model to measure media power during 
humanitarian crises in particular, and investigated whether it influences government decisions 
to intervene (2000). He argued that media coverage of war may be framed to empathise with 
suffering people, therefore encouraging support for intervention; or alternatively, coverage 
may allow an emotional distance, separating the reader from those in conflict and therefore 
promoting of non-intervention (2000: 616). 
Robinson’s work involving the framing of victims (2000) relied somewhat on the work of 
Shaw (1996). Shaw argued that the media has significant influence on the likelihood of 
international intervention (1996: 156). He conducted a study of television and print media 
representations and international responses to the 1991 Gulf War (1996), and investigated 
why some conflicts (such as the Kurdish revolt against Saddam Hussein’s regime) received 
extensive media coverage – and intervention – while others (such as the Shia people’s revolt 
against Hussein) did not. He questioned why brutal conflicts in Angola, Cambodia, and (at the 
time) Afghanistan received so little diplomatic and media attention when other, lesser 
conflicts were widely publicised (1996: 4, 159). As well as strategic interests, Shaw 
concluded that certain conflicts warrant media pressure for intervention because of their 
“histories of linkage” with the West (1996: 8 - 10). Western media focuses predominantly on 




Empathy frames traditionally highlight the human-rights angle of a conflict, and therefore 
promotes the policy of intervention (Shaw, 2012: 83). This sort of framing is most commonly 
achieved through the representation of a “victim” (Robinson, 2000). Media analyst Alison 
Preston described this kind of framing as a “narrative template of proximity” and claimed that 
the “ordinary individual” is highlighted in order to create feelings of empathy in the media 
consumer (1996: 112). Policy-makers often invoke empathy framing to justify intervention 
into humanitarian crises (Robinson, 2002: 29). For example, imagery of starving children was 
used by George Bush Senior to justify US intervention into Somalia (Robinson, 2002: 29). 
Through empathy framing, Western readers are encouraged to identify with the heroic 
character in interventionist narratives, reading stories concerning victims as a call for help or 
protection (Orford, 2003: 166).  
Empathy framing is further achieved through the “infantilisation” of so-called barbaric 
nations and people. Media’s portrayal of people of Africa, Asia, South America, and Eastern 
Europe as “childlike, primitive, barbaric or unable to govern themselves” (Orford, 2003: 172) 
suggests an infant-like state, in need of protection and guidance from “civilised” nations. In 
readings of such interventionist literature, the attributes of the Western, modern, developed 
world are “valued over, and defined against, the supposed attributes of the backward, non-
Western world” (Barkawi, 2004: 118). This assumption reflects an imperial, colonial attitude 
permeating contemporary intervention rhetoric. 
Distance Framing 
Distance framing, on the other hand, is either directly or indirectly supportive of non-
intervention (Shaw, 2012: 83). This kind of framing portrays parties involved in both sides of 
a conflict as “different” from the reader, and without the hope of “salvation” from an outside 
intervener. Distance framing may refer to conflicts as “ancient hatreds”, or containing “deep-
rooted problems” that imply in irreconcilable situation – for example, portraying suffering 
people as members of “warring ‘tribes’” (Robinson, 2000: 616). 
Shaw identified the phenomenon as a “process of distancing” that occurs in media coverage 
of foreign conflicts (1996: 8). In his study of the Gulf War, he discovered that the Kurdish 
people, in their revolt against Saddam Hussein’s regime, were represented as victims and 
were deemed worthy of intervention by the international community (1996).  However, the 
Shia people, in their revolt in the south of Iraq, were not represented as “innocent” victims, 
despite the brutal suppression of their rebellion, and were therefore not advocated as a case 
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for intervention (1996). The way both sides of the Shia conflict were portrayed as guilty of 
crimes, signifies a distancing in Western media when there is no clearly identifiable “victim”. 
Identifying Empathy and Distance Frames 
Robinson outlined a set of “descriptors” for coding media frames in his study of US 
intervention in Bosnia and Operation Allied Force in Kosovo (2000). When analysing media 
frames Robinson identified a list of terms corresponding with empathy framing, and a list 
corresponding with distance framing (2000: 616). Examples of empathy descriptors used in 
relation to the Kosovar Albanian people, and intervention into the conflict, included: 
“thousands of refugees”, “desperate people”, “rape, torture and executions”, “Old and young . 
. . suffering from exposure”, “helpless men, women and children”, and “homes reduced to 
rubble” (Robinson, 2000: 628). These were classified as terms which would evoke pity and 
concern in the Western media consumer. Descriptors for distance framing included terms such 
as: “minimize risks rather than maximize results”, “sending mixed messages”, “Kosovo 
policy jinx”, “shameful miscalculation”, “grievous political mistake”, “we are unprepared”, 
and “failed to weaken ... Milosevic” (Robinson, 2000: 628). These (often critical) descriptors 
were understood as discouraging intervention into the situation and therefore distancing the 
conflict. 
2.6 Coding Categories 
To Robinson’s empathy and distance framing model, this study adds the analysis of different 
“characters” or “actors” in the conflict, in order to identify any hero, victim or villain frames 
used in media coverage. This study largely draws on the coding categories of “actors” used in 
enemy image literature (see Bahador, 2012; Steuter and Wills, 2010; Merskin, 2004; Ottosen 
1995). Much of this literature has focused on the “demonising” of enemy leaders, 
“dehumanising” of an enemy people, and Bahador’s study, in particular, focused on the 
“rehumanising” of an enemy people after war (2012). Two of the coding categories Bahador 
used in his study, which proved particularly relevant to this study, were: “Character 
Descriptions” (terms which describe the individual actors in a conflict) and “Our Future 
Actions” (how “we” should respond to the conflict) (2012: 200). Within his “character 
description” category, Bahador identified six frames, which are listed below, ranging from 
dehumanisation and demonization to re-humanisation and empathy framing. These frames 
provided a useful template for analysis and were used in the methodology of this study. Part 
of the coding analysis of this study was also modelled on Bahador’s options for “Our Future 
Actions”, which are also listed below. 
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Character description options, as outlined by Bahador (2012: 200, 201): 
1. Non-human characteristics (dehumanizing and demonizing): inhuman traits such as 
animals, and superhuman traits such as demons, monsters and machines. 
2. Negative human characteristics: negative adjectives such as aggressive and irrational. Also 
includes labelling using loaded words such as communist or terrorist. 
3. Differences contrasted: direct comparison of “us” and “them”. 
4. Differences highlighted but neutral, not necessarily positive or negative. 
5. Similarities highlighted: includes ideas such as being in the same boat, sharing same 
concerns, and upholding similar values. 
6. Positive characteristics: positive adjectives to describe the other side, such as friendly. 
 
Our Future Actions options, as outlined by Bahador (2012: 201): 
1. Stop them through force, violence is necessary 
2. Stop through non-violent means: for example, appeal to international tribunals or the 
people themselves  
3. Help them: provide aid and assistance; help with their poverty and/or repression. 
4. Join them (in situations where cooperation with the people is possible). For example, fight 
beside them, work with them, and cooperate with them as equals. 
5. Step back/withdraw: stop intervening, allow the people to choose their own path, and give 
their sovereignty. 
6. Sympathize with them: understand and listen to them, use tact, and learn/respect their 
culture and customs. 
7. Be cautious: consider our options and the consequences of using violence, for example, 
think of civilian casualties. 
The role of Robinson’s framing model (2000, 2002) and Bahador’s coding categories (2012) 
in this study is explained in the next section, which discusses the methodology chosen for this 
thesis. 
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    Chapter 3                                                                  
Methodology 
As culture is constructed through language and textual representations, the ideal way to study 
a culture is through textual analysis (Plymire, 2005). Many media studies tend to contain 
either discourse or content analysis methodologies, as well as ethnographies and surveys, with 
most using a qualitative assessment (Groshek, 2008; Fein, 2000; Ottosen, 1995). Content 
analysis was therefore employed in this particular study.  
3.1 Choosing Case Studies 
The “ethnic” conflict case studies chosen for this particular investigation are, chronologically: 
the lead up to the 1994 Rwandan genocide; the Kosovo conflict of 1998/9 (leading up to 
NATO’s intervention); and the East Timor violence leading to intervention in 1999. Two of 
these three conflicts were the subjects of military intervention; the UN sanctioned air strikes 
on Serbian forces in 1999 in an attempt to halt atrocities in Kosovo (McGwire, 2000: 1) and 
the deployment troops to East Timor in an Australian-led intervention on 20 September 1999 
(Australian Defence Department, 2000). The Rwandan genocide stands out as an exception, 
leaving the international community wondering why earlier intervention did not occur in such 
a dire situation (Kuperman, 2000b: 95). These case studies were also chosen for their 
diversity – this cross-section covers interventions by the US (through NATO), the UN and 
Australia, as well as focusing on conflicts in Africa, the Pacific and Eastern Europe. Patterns 
that emerged in media representation of these conflicts have therefore been tested on conflicts 
from differing geographical and cultural regions. The recent intervention in East Timor was 
specifically chosen because the region has received limited academic attention compared to 
the conflicts in Kosovo and Rwanda.  
3.2 Conflict Timelines 
In order to investigate the media’s representation of the above “ethnic” conflicts prior to 
intervention, it was necessary to research media coverage from the time of the domestic 
conflict’s beginning up to the time of any interventions. Defining the “start date” of a conflict 
is difficult, as is determining when “intervention” occurred. For example, do economic 
sanctions signify international intervention in a country or does diplomatic pressure from the 
international community register as intervention? For the purposes of this study, 
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“intervention” was recognised as the day foreign troops were deployed to, or a foreign 
military force attacked, the country in question. Indirect interventions, such as economic 
sanctions or diplomatic facilitation were still analysed in the lead-up to physical foreign 
intervention, to capture the influence of international influence prior to foreign troops moving 
in. This study utilised the Uppsala University Peace and Conflict database to determine the 
“start date” for conflicts, which defines a conflict as active if there is “at least 25 battle-related 
deaths per calendar year” (2011). 
By these definitions, the dates for this study were decided as: 
Rwanda 
On October 3, 1990, the conflict reached over 25 battle-related deaths. While Rwanda did not 
receive military intervention, by August 1994,  most of the genocide had occurred 
(Kuperman, 2000b: 100), so this date was selected as the end of the period studied. 
Dates: 3 October, 1990 to 1 August, 1994 
Kosovo     
On March 6, 1998, the conflict reached over 25 battle-related deaths and on March 24, 1999 
NATO began bombing Belgrade (McGwire, 2000: 1; UCDP). 
Dates: 6 March, 1998 to 24 March, 1999 
East Timor     
On December 7, 1975, the conflict reached over 25 battle-related deaths. Troops were 
deployed in an Australian-led intervention on 20 September 1999 (Australian Defence 
Department, 2000). Due to the extensive length of this conflict, only the escalated 
violence/media coverage in the year prior to intervention was studied. 
Dates: 20 Sept, 1998 to 20 Sept, 1999 
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3.3 Selecting Newspapers 
Most print media studies rely on US newspapers, such as the New York Times and the 
Washington Post, understandably, given the USA’s disproportionate involvement in 
international military interventions (Groshek 2008; Balabanova: 2010). This study not only 
examined articles from major US newspapers but also from major Australian and British 
newspapers, in order to gain a wider understanding of how ethnic conflicts are portrayed the 
West. That is not to say that these three nations are the only ones capable or accurately 
representing “the West”. However these three stood out as powerful media drivers and were 
the main intervention states in the case studies chosen. This study also focused solely on 
English language media, due to language and resource restrictions, but it is important to note 
that the conclusions may be applicable in a broader context if further investigated. The 
impression of the “other” being akin to “barbarian” is, according to Alexander et al, not 
unique to the West (2005: 27).  
One newspaper from each country was selected, and where possible, with the widest 
circulation and highest readership. In the UK, The Sun had the largest circulation, The Daily 
Mail claimed the second largest, and The Times was the longest running daily paper. The Sun 
and The Daily Mail, however, are tabloid papers and since this study required three 
comparable papers, The Times was chosen. In the US, The Wall Street Journal had the highest 
circulation, followed by USA Today and The New York Times. However the Wall Street 
Journal is known as a financial publication and USA Today targets a very specific readership, 
so The New York Times was chosen for the USA component of this study. In Australia the 
Sydney Morning Herald was the oldest continuously published newspaper, The Australian 
was the biggest-selling national newspaper and The Age in Melbourne ranked third in 
circulation. Due to accessibility, the Sydney Morning Herald emerged as the best choice for 
this study. In an age of media concentration, the three papers chosen came from different 
news groups in an attempt to gain a cross-section of any bias: The Times is owned by News 
Corporation, The Sydney Morning Herald by Fairfax Media and The New York Times by The 
New York Times Company. The newspapers were accessed online, largely from the Dow 
Jones Factiva database, which contained much of the sample from the study’s timeline, but 
also supplemented by BBC Monitoring, Nexis.com, and online public libraries.  
Within each newspaper’s archive, 50 articles reporting on the conflicts were selected within 
the time frame previously indicated. This was done by dividing the total number of articles 
that addressed the conflict by 50, resulting in “x” number of articles, and then selecting every 
“x”th article. This resulted in 150 articles for each conflict, and a total of 450 articles.  
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The following rules were then established for determining and distinguishing units of analysis 
(UOA): 
- A UOA was defined as any one sentence in the article that mentions the country in 
conflict  
- Within each article, up to three UOAs were analysed, in order to identify the range of 
frames used, but not over-represent any particular story. 
- UOAs were read/understood in the context of the whole paragraph/story.  
- Headlines did not count as UOAs as they often did not address most of the categories 
on the coding sheet.  
- UOAs which discuss more than one actor (differently) were split into two UOAs (e.g. 
“The Hutus and Tutsi tribes are fighting each other” was recorded as one UOA, while 
“The Hutu military is attacking Tutsi civilians” was analysed as two UOAs – once 
with the Hutu military as the main actor, and a second time with the Tutsi civilians as 
the main actor). This rule will be clarified once the coding scheme is described in the 
next section. 
Total Numbers 
This selection process resulted in a total of 369 sentences from the 150 articles on the 
Rwandan conflict, 388 sentences for Kosovo and 356 for East Timor, with a total of 1,113 
sentences analysed. However, as some of these sentences were further divided into separate 
units when multiple differing actors were  mentioned, a total of 1,746 UOAs were identified 
and analysed, an average of 1.5 actors mentioned per sentence.  
3.4 Analysis and Coding 
Using Robinson’s classifications of media framing, this study categorised units of analysis 
within newspaper articles into those that empathise and those that distance the “ethnic” 
conflict reported (2000: 616). This study identified descriptors which either: empathise with 
the victims of “barbaric” situations (and therefore encourage the reader to support 
intervention); or distance the ethnic groups in the case studies chosen (reflecting a presumed 
“exception” to humanitarian intervention concerning “native” conflicts). This study aimed to 
reveal the extent to which conflicts framed with an empathising angle were portrayed as a 
nation or a people in need of assistance (unable to help themselves, with barbaric 
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governments/situations), while those with a distancing frame were represented as native 
conflicts, too difficult to wade into. The coding categories were determined as: Actor, 
Character Description, Role in Conflict, Actions Proposed for Internal Parties, and Actions 
Proposed for External Parties. These categories and the options within them are further 
discussed below. 
Category 1: Actor 
An “actor” is one of the participants involved in the conflict. Each UOA analysed was 
required to have at least one actor. If more than one actor was mentioned using different 
frames, then the sentence was split into two UOAs for greater precision.  
The categories for the “actor” of a unit of analysis were as follows: 
1. Side A’s military force or political leaders (Rwandan Government; Milosevic or Serbian 
forces, Indonesian government or army) 
2. Side A people (not military force or leaders, Hutu; Serbians; Indonesian people) 
3. Side B’s military force or political leaders (RPF/Tutsi; KLA/Albanian separatists; East 
Timorese/pro-independence forces) 
4. Side B people (not military force or leaders, Tutsi; ethnic Albanians, East Timorese) 
5. Both Side A and B people, or country in conflict in general (unidentified, Rwandans; 
Yugoslavians; both Indonesian and East Timorese).  
6. Unidentified rebels or militia, operating in country in conflict.  
7. International community (governments, military powers, UN, NATO, neighbouring 
countries, or citizens outside of country in conflict) 
*Note: There is no N/A for this category, as any sentence that did not discuss at least one of 
the parties above was by default, not a valid UOA. 
Table 1 outlines the categories of actors specific to each conflict studied. 
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Table 1: Actor Categories 
Actor Kosovo East Timor Rwanda 
    
Side A military 
Milosevic or Serbian 
forces 




Side A people Serbians Indonesians Hutu 






Side B people Kosovo Albanians East Timorese Tutsi forces 
Both Side A and B 
people 
Yugoslavians Rwandans 




General reference to 
rebels/militia 






Countries other than 
Serbia/Kosovo 





Category 2: Character description 
The character framing of those in conflict can have a powerful effect on the reader. In this 
category, Robinson’s theories on distancing and empathy frames (2000) and Bahador’s (2012: 
195-212) methodologies were used, with one end of the scale measuring distance frames, such 
as “non-human” and “negative” characteristics being attributed to those in conflict, and the 
other extreme encouraging readers to empathise with actors through “similarities or positive” 
characteristics being highlighted. 
The coding options for this category were as follows: 
1. Non-human characteristics; Lacking humanity – or emphasis of inhuman traits – 
dehumanization by likening to other species. For example “Demons”, “monsters”, “animals”, 
“machines”, “clawing at each other”, references to “jungle” animals etc. Includes mention of 
vaccine tests carried out on them, rather than on animals and prioritising animals over humans 
in the conflict. 
2. Negative human characteristics or infantilisation – e.g. “Savage”, “evil”, “aggressive”, 
“irrational”, “primitive”, shadowy characteristics – “dark and skulking”, “untrustworthy” etc. 
Also includes Colonial stereotypes: “Barbaric”, “primitive”, “uncivilised”, “archaic”, “dark 
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ages”, “undeveloped”, “pre-modern”, “savage”, “tribal”, “corrupt”, “unstable”, “fractured”, 
“ethnic tension”, engaged in “bush wars” or “ethnic” divides. Also includes differences that 
are highlighted/contrasted, e.g. “us” compared to “them” and “othering”, “foreign”, “third 
world”, “unsustainable”, “over-populated”, references to “jungle”, “villages”, “AIDS-ridden”, 
“cholera epidemics” and “refugees”. Infantilisation: “irresponsible”, “unruly”, “child-like”, 
“squabbles”, suggestions that we are responsible for them in some way, or must protect them 
is an action – not a character trait. Unable to grasp concept of democracy, in need of foreign 
rule. 
3. Similarities highlighted or positive characteristics – “friends”, “in the same boat”, sharing 
same concerns, upholding similar values. Call for human rights to be upheld. Includes 
celebrating together. Positive adjectives (eg. “brave”, “passionate”, “loyal”. “powerful 
allies”). 
4. N/A – there are no “character” attributes described. 
 
Category 3: Role in conflict 
One of the most significant indicators of empathy and distance framing in media coverage of 
conflicts was the role attributed to the actor discussed. At one extreme, actors were portrayed 
as “aggressors”, increasing the violence within the conflict and attacking others. One the other 
end of the scale were “victims”, innocent civilians suffering because of the conflict. 
This study identified six options for the roles described in news articles, which are outlined 
below: 
1. Aggressors (increasing conflict) - Oppressing others through violent acts. Attacking or 
planning to attack. Must be a specific reference to violent action being taken/planned. 
Includes smuggling/stock-piling weapons. 
2. Preventing/delaying peace – Oppressing others through non-violent acts, refusing to 
surrender/negotiate/compromise, increasing/maintaining tension in some way, failing to meet 
peace agreements. Threatening to “react”, “respond” or “defend”, with or without violence, 
includes fighting back after attacked. Supportive of authority/military force/rebel groups on 
their side of the conflict. Includes informed passive observers – informed but 
refusing/neglecting to act (must be obvious).  Includes sarcastic articles using quote marks to 
suggest/imply the opposite, e.g. “The people marched in a “peace” protest.” Ignoring 
innocents or victims (e.g. “The USA has ignored suffering in Rwanda”).  
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3. Forced to act or mislead. Forced to support war efforts/Forced to make sacrifices to 
support war. Forced to support the fighting force, e.g. Supplying resources. Includes non-
informed – ignorant or lacking information, mislead by Government/propaganda/opposition. 
4. Promoting peace – negotiating and meeting, celebrating together, participating together, 
showing understanding of the opposition as equals. Includes international threats portrayed as 
necessary to stop or punish wrongdoings and past or present humanitarian help (e.g. 
Foreigners living and working as missionaries/teachers/doctors). Includes people shown as 
unsupportive of war efforts or war-seeking government/leadership/authority – rebellion, lack 
of confidence, and (if focusing on people) instances of the government killing/silencing 
dissent. Sending peace-keeping forces. Upholding cease-fire agreements. Voting rather than 
fighting for rights. 
5. Victims (or disadvantaged due to the circumstances) – e.g. “Victims”, “denied human 
rights”, “displaced”, “refugee”, “hungry”, “deprived”, “suffering”, “persecuted”, “attacked”, 
“subjected”, “supressed”, “repressed”, “violated”, “innocent”, “civilian”, “scared”, “without 
food/water/basic shelter”, “praying”, “huddling”, “trudging”, “raped”, “murdered”, 
“wailing/crying/mourning”, “tragic”, “desperate”, “sick”, “diseased”, “denied voting rights”. 
Includes forced to support the conflict or mislead by authorities. Includes requests for outside 
intervention, “let down by international community”, “ignored by international community”.  
6. N/A – there are no descriptions of role in conflict. 
 
Category 4: Actions proposed for internal parties 
This category coded any suggestions for solutions or resolutions that could, or should, be 
achieved by parties directly involved in the conflict. This again measured distance and 
empathy framing. Proposals for warring groups to “sort it out themselves” distanced readers, 
while suggestions of “working with interveners” promoted an empathy frame. 
There were three options identified for the category, as outlined here: 
1. Sort it out themselves - The people/ leaders/military involved should either co-operate 
(negotiate, find peace etc), surrender, or continue fighting (unite against their opposition, 
remaining independent, resisting opposition, includes leaders asking for internal support etc.) 
– without mention of outside intervention. Includes suggestions of the conflict being an 
“internal affair”. 
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2. The people or people’s leaders should resolve the conflict (peacefully or through victory) 
with outside intervention – This includes non-military: diplomatic facilitation or humanitarian 
aid as well as outside military assistance. 
3. N/A – there are no suggestions for action 
 
Category 5: Actions proposed for external parties 
The final category of the coding analysis recorded suggestions for outside actors to intervene, 
or not to intervene, in the conflict. The distancing element in this section applied to calls for 
the international community to refrain from intervening, or withdraw troops already operating 
in the country in conflict, as well as suggestions that the situation is unsolvable by outside 
parties. The empathy framing at the other end of the scale referred to strong suggestions of 
intervention, often explained as a call for halting human rights violations and “helping” or 
“saving” victims in the conflict. 
The options for this category are shown below: 
1.Outside parties (including media’s own country) must not intervene, e.g. this is not our 
fight, we cannot help. For example: reference to unsolvable rivals: “Ancient” or “ethnic” 
hatreds,  “deep-rooted” problems. Includes we, or others, must step back/withdraw/reform – 
stop intervening, allow the people to choose their own path, give sovereignty, change our 
laws/actions. Includes foreign aid/nationals leaving the country (e.g. Red Cross evacuating). 
2. Outside parties must be cautious – think of civilian casualties, international repercussions 
of intervening, consider options, consequences, limited resources. Includes warnings/threats. 
Includes reference to more important issues, or perspective needed (including more concern 
for animals in the region than people, such as Rwandan Gorillas). Reference to “failed” 
intervention/war/peace treaty collapsing: Vietnam, Beirut, Lebanon, Sudan (Fein 2000: 50), 
Somalia in 1992/93.   
3. Don’t use violence but stop or ease conflict through other means. E.g. appeal to 
International tribunals or courts. Or appeal to the people themselves. Moving 
people/relocating people, protecting with sanctions, diplomatic pressure. Make benefits of 
peace tangible, includes “set an example”, “lead by example”, or sending diplomats. Fund 
other (neighbouring) countries’ interventions. We must help (aid and assistance) on 
humanitarian level e.g. physically help with poverty, repression, relief assistance.  
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4. Outside parties must help them with military action/intervention, protect with military 
force/peace-keeping force. Code for: “lead”, “help”, “assist”, “aid”, “save”, “protect”. Also 
includes criticism of inaction: See Robinson’s critical descriptors (2000: 620). Includes 
references to discussions held to consider sending help/troops. Includes references to 
successful interventions/wars and universal moral obligation (to punish and redress crimes 
against humanity) (Fein 2000: 50): Hitler, Nazi Germany, Holocaust, WW1, WW11, 
atrocities, genocide, illegal, Gulf War (1990/91). Includes references to international 
peace/balance being threatened, neighbouring countries being drawn into war, and reference 
to conflicts escalating if left alone eg “could turn into a Cyprus or Northern Ireland on our 
northern border”.  
5. N/A – No action suggested for external parties. 
Example 
An example of this study’s coding can be seen here: 
In the New York Times, on the 16
th
 of March, 1998 an article headlined Forensic Team 
Requests Visas To Visit Kosovo began with: 
“A group of international forensic experts have applied for Serbian 
visas so they can examine the bodies of ethnic Albanians killed by 
Serbian police officers in Kosovo Province.” 
This sentence was separated into three UOAs because of the three different actors discussed: 
the international community, the Albanian people, and the Serbian police force. 
As per the coding sheet provided, the international community was coded as having no 
specific character reference; a “promoting peace” role (in what appears to be attempts to seek 
international truth/justice); with no suggestion of internal resolution but with the suggestion of 
stopping or easing the conflict through international aid or facilitation. The Albanian people 
were coded as having a negative characteristic (“ethnic” suggests a racially determined group 
– differing from homogenous democratic societies); as having a victims’ role in the conflict; 
with no suggestion of internal solution to the conflict; but with the suggestion of external 
aid/facilitation. The Serbian police were coded as having no specific character adjectives; as 
having an attacking/aggressors’ role in the conflict; and the suggestion of external facilitation 
to ease/investigate the truth in the conflict.  
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The coding’s relation to empathy/distance framing can perhaps be better understood in the 
following table. Table 2 shows the various categories classified as either empathy or distance 
frames. 
Table 2: Coding for Empathy and Distance Framing 
Category coded Empathy framing Distance framing 


















for internal parties 
Resolve conflict with 
outside intervention 
Sort it out themselves 
Actions proposed 
for external parties 
Stop conflict 
through means 
other than military 
Outside parties must 
intervene (military) 
Outside parties must 
not intervene 
Outside parties must 
be cautious 
3.5 Limitations  
The content analysis method of study does, however, have limitations, and this section 
outlines the approach taken to minimise these. Some researchers have suggested that the 
downfall of studies which rely on textual analysis readings is the possibility of “textual 
determinism”. This is the concern that the researcher alone determines how the material is 
interpreted, without the input of the audience or possibility of multiple interpretations (Ang, 
1991). To reduce the possibility of textual determinism, within the reasonable parameters of 
this study, an inter-coder reliability test was conducted. Table 3 shows the results of the inter-
coder testing, which involved a second coder testing a 10 per cent sample (15 news stories) of 
each conflict and inter-coder reliability tests being applied, using percentage agreement, 
Scott’s Pi (1955), Cohen’s Kappa (1960) and Krippendorff’s alpha (nominal) (2004) for each 
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variable. From the 45 articles in the sample, which incorporated 164 units of analysis, a 
satisfactory level of reliability was achieved. 












       
Actor 93.9% 0.921 0.921 0.921 154 10 
Character 85.4% 0.732 0.732 0.733 140 24 
Role 89.6% 0.87 0.87 0.87 147 17 
Internal proposals 93.9% 0.747 0.747 0.748 154 10 
External 
proposals 
92.1% 0.806 0.806 0.806 151 13 
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    Chapter 4 
Findings 
This chapter examines the findings for each individual conflict; it begins by providing some 
relevant background information on the media’s role in the conflict, and then presents the 
findings within each conflict separately. In the next chapter a comparison of the three 
conflicts is made, to highlight the differences in the international media’s portrayal of each 
war. The results of this study support some of the theories surrounding Western media’s 
portrayal of “ethnic” conflicts, and challenge others, and the implications of the findings are 
discussed in the final chapter. 
4.1 Rwanda 
Rwanda in Context 
The violence in Rwanda in 1994 saw up to 800,000 people killed, and was deemed – in 
retrospect – as one of the world’s most horrific genocides (Bilder, 1999: 8; Fein, 2000). With 
the Tutsi death toll of this genocide standing at seventy-seven per cent of the population 
(507,000 out of an estimated 657,000) this genocide emerges as one of the few in which the 
majority of the targeted group were annihilated (Fein, 2000: 57; Des Forges, 1999:15-16; 
Fowler and Sarkin, 2010: 2). The perpetrators, now understood to be extremist Hutus, 
represented a faction of the ruling ethnic group – Rwanda was led by a Hutu-dominated 
government at the time.  Rwanda had been in civil conflict for several years before the 
genocide, with the Rwandan Patriotic Front – a Tutsi-dominated group of Rwandan refugees 
based in Uganda – posing a serious threat to the Hutu government. Extremist Hutu, and the 
military forces they controlled, were presumably threatened by the imposition of a new 
political system and the attacks mounted by the RPF (Fein, 2000: 55; Kuperman, 2000b). 
The speed of the genocide, only understood in hindsight, was remarkable. Within the first two 
weeks of the genocide, loosely defined as beginning April 7, 1994, almost 40 per cent of 
Rwanda’s Tutsi had been killed – making it the fastest genocide rate ever recorded 
(Kuperman, 2000b: 98; Fowler and Sarkin, 2010: 2; Shaw 1996: 170). Figure 1 shows the 
estimated pace of the genocide. 
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Figure 1: Estimated Pace of Genocide in Rwanda  
 (Kuperman, 2000b: 98) 
The international community, the UN and leading states, have since been heavily criticised for 
not intervening earlier in the conflict, despite reports of some warnings from insider accounts 
(Fein, 2000: 57; Dowden, 2004: 283; Robertson, 1999: 55; Fowler and Sarkin, 2010: 3,6,8). 
Then-US President, Bill Clinton, has admitted this failure to assist Rwanda, and has expressed 
regret for the USA’s part in withdrawing UN troops early in the genocide (Dowden, 2004: 
283). UN-General Secretary Kofi Annan stated that the genocide in Rwanda will define, for 
our generation, the “consequences of inaction in the face of mass murder” (1999). While 
debates continue over whether or not international intervention could have halted the majority 
of Tutsi killings, given the speed of the genocide (Kuperman, 2000b; Fowler and Sarkin, 
2010), this study examined how the press represented the conflict at the time.  
Like the international community, the world’s press have been accused of failing Rwanda 
with inaccurate and ill-informed coverage of the conflict (Thompson, 2007: 160; Kuperman, 
2000a; Fowler and Sarkin, 2010: 14, 15). Understood in context, it is reasonable (however 
unacceptable it may be) to see how the press physically “missed the story” in Rwanda. Access 
to the country at the beginning of the genocide was difficult and dangerous, and the biggest 
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story coming out of Africa at the time was the coming South African election, ending the 
apartheid rule (Dowden, 2004: 284; Thompson, 2007: 158; Fowler and Sarkin, 2010: 13). 
Most of the international press had gathered in South Africa to cover Nelson Mandela’s rise, 
including press usually based in Nairobi, who could have conceivably covered the outbreak of 
genocide in Rwanda (Dowden, 2004: 285). On the global stage also, Rwanda’s conflict did 
not take precedence at the time – most of the world was focusing on the war in Bosnia 
(Livingston, 2007: 192, 193; Thompson, 2007: 162). 
Regardless of the debate concerning geographical stationing of media at the time, the primary 
criticism of media eventually covering Rwanda was the way in which the conflict was 
described. Rwanda stands out as a clear example of Western media resorting to an “ancient 
ethnic hatred” framework (Shaw, 2012: 140; Carruthers, 2004: 164). The language used to 
portray the civil war was heavily loaded with primordial tribal references (Dowden, 2004: 
288; Thompson, 2007: 150) and the conflict is now understood to have been grossly 
oversimplified in international media (Fardon, 1999: 64; Dowden, 2004; Thompson, 2007). 
Early reports of “ethnic tension”, “tribal divisions” (Krauss, The New York Times, October 
1990), and “months of violent tribal conflict” (Lewis, The New York Times, 07 April 1994), 
represented the situation in Rwanda as yet another primitive African conflict. In 1993, The 
Times released an article headlined “Tribalism side-tracks Africa’s Hopeful March towards 
Democracy” (Kiley) and on April 8, 1994, discussed a “wave of tribal killings”. US television 
coverage, in particular, focused on the theme of “mutual ethnic slaughter” (Adelman, 1996: 
46). Even on April 16, 1994, after most of the Tutsi population had been killed, the Sydney 
Morning Herald reported the massacres as “the region’s latest wave of ethnic violence” 
(Tompsett). It wasn’t until much later that the world press began to realise that the perceived 
“tribal chaos” was, in fact, a well-organised and politically-motivated genocide (Dowden, 
2004: 290; Thompson, 2007: 145, 162). Rwanda was more than just an ethnic battle between 
Hutus and Tutsis. With international actors, such as French and Belgian forces, and organised 
external groups, such as the Ugandan-based Rwandan Patriotic Front, it is difficult to 
understand why media institutions decided to simplify the conflict to a “tribal” battle. The 
theory that the Rwandan conflict was represented as a “native” battle formed part of the 
hypothesis of this thesis, and is tested by the findings in the following section.  
Another criticism of the international community’s dismissal of the Rwandan conflict is the 
suggestion that the “ethnicities” involved were not as distinct, or as solidified as the 
international community assumed at the time. It has been widely acknowledged that many 
African tribal identities were either created, or at least solidified, by European colonisers 
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(Allen and Seaton, 1999: 29; Bowen, 1996; Kuperman, 1996: 221, Caplan and Torpey eds, 
2001: 345). Belgian colonial rulers have been attributed with assigning “ethnicities” to the 
Hutu and Tutsi people in their issuing of identity cards, despite the two “tribes” being more 
intertwined than believed. In this particular case the Tutsi minority was favoured by the 
Belgian and French colonisers, as wealthier landowners, and although many Hutu and Tutsi 
had intermarried to such an extent that they were unable to be physically distinguished, the 
two factions were divided (Bowen, 1996; Kuperman, 1996: 221, Caplan and Torpey eds, 
2001: 345). In this way, many poor Tutsis were identified as Hutu, and many wealthy Hutu 
were labelled Tutsi (Bowen, 1996). The simplistic media framing of two warring “tribes” in 
Rwanda in 1994 ignored the possibility of Western colonial policies having contributed to the 
country’s “ethnic” divide (Fowler and Sarkin, 2010: 11). 
Rwandan Results 
Actors 
In this study, analysis of the “actors” proved very revealing in regards to the way in which 
Western media approached the case studies. Table 4 summarises the amount of coverage each 
of the identified actors received in the Rwandan conflict.  
Table 4: Actors Identified in References, Rwanda 
Actor Rwanda 
  
Side A military or leaders (Hutu gov./forces) 14.8% 
Side A people (Hutu) 2.5% 
Side B military or leaders (RPF) 13.8% 
Side B people (Tutsi) 2.8% 
Both sides or country in general 34.3% 
Unidentified rebels or militia 2.1% 




These results show that the leading actor discussed in international media concerning the 
Rwandan conflict was “both sides or the country in general”. This means that within the units 
of analysis in this study, the actor most frequently discussed was Rwanda as a whole nation, 
(or reference to both Hutu and Tutsis). The role of the international community was also a 
main focus of media articles, while the Rwandan government and Rwandan Patriotic Front (as 
side A and B) drew almost equal, but lesser coverage. A noticeable absence is that of the Hutu 
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and Tutsi people, rather than military force. The people of Rwanda were often identified as a 
whole – without distinctions being made between ethnic groups. This indicates that, overall, 
the Rwandan conflict was discussed in a general sense, without in-depth media discussions of 
the various factions involved in the war.  
Character 
Table 5 examines how the character of each of the identified actors was described (if at all). 











      
Side A leaders (Rwandan Gov) 0.0% 33.3% 1.3% 65.4% 100% 
Side A people (Hutu) 0.0% 30.8% 0.0% 69.2% 100% 
Side B leaders (RPF) 0.0% 24.7% 2.7% 72.6% 100% 
Side B people (Tutsi) 0.0% 20.0% 0.0% 80.0% 100% 
Both sides/country in general 1.1% 55.8% 3.9% 39.2% 100% 
Unidentified rebels or militia 0.0% 45.5% 0.0% 54.5% 100% 
International community 0.0% 1.3% 5.1% 93.6% 100% 
 
The three newspapers most often described Rwanda, or Rwandans as a whole group, as 
having “negative human characteristics”. Fifty-five per cent of the references made to 
Rwanda/Rwandans were negative, with only 3.9 per cent highlighting similarities or 
portraying positive characteristics. These “negative” human characteristics frequently 
described the refugee living conditions, which, while not blamed on the actor, still functioned 
as a distancing tool from the reader – Rwandans were living in third-world conditions, they 
were the “other”, different from “us”. For example, on April 9, 1994, the New York Times 
published an article headlined “The Nightmare in Central Africa”, discussing the “widely held 
view in the West” that “democratic roots simply will not sprout in some African countries”, 
which consisted of “tribes and cultures whose only common heritage, unless held in check by 
a brutal dictatorship, is warfare against one another”. Another frequent reference was to 
“ethnic” ties – “ethnic killings”, “ethnic bloodshed”, “ethnic problems” etc. “Tribal” was 
another description that occurred frequently, with references to “tribal bloodletting”, “tribal 
violence” and “tribalism, so vividly on parade”. Other one-off descriptions included “Africa’s 
current horror story”, “a bush war” and references to the country’s general problems with 
population, the AIDS virus and gender inequality.  
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The 1.1 per cent of descriptions of Rwanda in general that fell into the “non-human 
characteristic” frame consisted of four references to “wild” or “jungle-like” situations, as well 
as suggestions that AIDS drug testing should be carried out on humans in Rwanda, rather than 
on animals. Several references were also made regarding how human bodies were destroying 
the once-beautiful countryside and that the fate of the gorilla species in Rwanda was in 
jeopardy because of the war. These descriptions were understood, in this study, as placing the 
status of Rwandan people below that of animals. 
Characteristics of unidentified rebels or militia, if discussed at all, were always negative and 
usually involved reports of unidentified groups committing massacres or atrocities against 
innocent victims. Side A, the Rwandan government and army were shown in a slightly less 
favourable light than Side B, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, although both were – when 
discussed – portrayed as predominantly negative. Both Hutu and Tutsi people, when 
identified separately were also portrayed as having negative characteristics – when any 
character traits were mentioned – with 10 per cent more negative characteristics attributed to 
the Hutu people than the Tutsi people overall. In this study’s findings, neither group were 
ever referred to as having similarities to the reader or positive characteristics.  
As well as the characteristics of actors, an analysis of their represented role in the conflict was 
also conducted, and the findings are summarised in Table 6. 









       
Side A leaders (Rwandan Gov.) 28.8% 11.1% 0.0% 18.0% 12.0% 3.7% 
Side A people (Hutu) 4.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.9% 0.0% 
Side B leaders (RPF) 36.7% 4.8% 0.0% 26.0% 0.0% 4.5% 
Side B people (Tutsi) 1.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 9.2% 0.0% 
Both sides or country in general 20.1% 3.2% 0.0% 6.0% 69.0% 37.3% 
Unidentified rebels or militia 7.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
International community 0.7% 81.0% 0.0% 50.0% 4.9% 54.5% 
       
Total 100% 100% 0% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Of the two “sides” in conflict, it is interesting to note that the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan 
Patriotic Front was portrayed as the more aggressive side. This included stories of attacks, 
killings or plans to attack. The RPF was represented as the aggressors of the situation almost 
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10 per cent more than the Hutu-dominated Rwandan army. However the RPF, and Tutsi 
leaders were also portrayed more often as seeking peace than their Side A counterparts.  
The international community dominated the section coded for “preventing peace”. This 
appeared in the form of criticism for past interventions or occupations meddling in Rwanda, 
present withdrawal of peace keepers, or so far ignoring the plight of the Rwandan people. The 
international community also appeared as the most active party in pursuing peace, through 
establishing diplomatic negotiations. 
Despite initial media confusion over which tribes were being targeted, and who made up the 
refugee population expelled during the conflict, the Tutsi people were eventually portrayed 
more often as victims than the Hutu population were. The Hutu civilian population did receive 
some coverage as victims, but also almost equally as they were discussed as aggressors. The 
highest reference to victims however, came in references to the country, or population, as a 
whole. Sixty-nine per cent of references to “victims” did not distinguish between Hutu, Tutsi 
or other groups involved in the conflict – Rwanda as a nation and its people in general were 
described as victims.  
Table 7 summarises the “proposed actions” for both internal parties in the conflict, and the 
wider global community. 
Table 7: Actions Proposed for Internal and External Parties, Rwanda 
Actions proposed (internal and external parties) Rwanda 
  
Internal parties should sort it out themselves 10.6% 
Internal parties should seek peace/victory with intervention 6.3% 
N/A for Internal parties 83.1% 
 100% 
Outsiders must NOT intervene 11.4% 
Outsiders must be cautious 8.5% 
Non-violently stop conflict (diplomats etc) 16.3% 
Stop conflict through intervention/military action 13.1% 
N/A for External parties 50.8% 
 100% 
 
The actions proposed for both internal and external parties involved in the conflict have 
similar implications, so will be discussed together. In the case of the Rwandan conflict, very 
little discussion took place in media coverage concerning what internal parties should do 
about the situation. More emphasis was placed on the international community’s response to 
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the conflict, although this too was only discussed in half of the references. When solutions 
and responses were covered, the majority of the suggestions for internal parties were to “sort 
it out themselves”, while external parties were most frequently called on to stop the violence 
by sending diplomats to facilitate negotiations, or by sending humanitarian aid. The little 
difference between references for and against intervention by the international community 
(11.4 per cent opposed, 8.5 per cent wary of intervention, and 13 per cent in favour of full 
military intervention) shows that the intervention debate, in the media at least, was fairly 
even. However, more often than not, the debate did not arise, and resolutions were not 
discussed.  
The suggested actions can be further analysed according to the three separate newspapers 
chosen for this study, to examine how the possibility of intervention into Rwanda was 
portrayed in the USA, Australia and the UK (Table 8). 















       
New York Times 8.8% 4.7% 9.8% 11.2% 65.6% 100% 
The Times 19.2% 9.6% 18.6% 13.8% 38.9% 100% 
Sydney Morning Herald 6.2% 13.0% 23.3% 15.1% 42.5% 100% 
 
During the lead-up to intervention in Rwanda, none of the newspapers studied appeared to be 
framing the story as a case worthy of military intervention. The Sydney Morning Herald 
focused on suggestions for diplomatic or humanitarian intervention more than the other 
papers, with 23.3 per cent of its coverage suggesting the approach. The Times was more 
focused on calls to refrain from intervening (with 19.2 per cent of its coverage suggesting so), 
while the New York Times did not even debate the possibility in over half of the references to 
Rwanda. 
Calls for Intervention over Time 
Suggestions made for international intervention within media coverage of Rwanda were also 
considered temporally – with Error! Reference source not found. demonstrating the 




Figure 2: Calls for Intervention into Rwanda 
 
While calls for intervention were monitored in the year prior to October 1993, there was such 
limited mention of intervention that they were omitted from the graph.  
In the lead-up to the outbreak of the worst violence in Rwanda, most media reports contained 
little debate for international intervention into the situation. The discussion of intervention 
increased between March and April, 1994, as the reports of violence began to flow into media 
channels, but the strongest suggestion was still that of on non-intervention. News stories did 
not portray the conflict in Rwanda as one worthy of intervention, with warnings of the 
recently failed intervention into Somalia ringing in the international community’s ears. 
However, when the first reports of a nation-wide genocide broke in April 1994 (Kuperman, 
2000b: 98), calls for military intervention into the situation sharply increased and peaked. 
These suggestions were also closely followed by calls for diplomatic interventions (or 
suggestions of humanitarian aid supplies) and warnings that the global community should be 
cautious when considering intervention. Non-intervention advocates quietened during the next 
two months but rose again when the situation continued into June. By July, more calls for 
non-intervention were being reported than suggestions of full military intervention. It appears 
the global media compromised these competing views with overwhelming reports calling for 
diplomatic intervention, and proposals for humanitarian aid to be delivered to refugees. This 
suggestion dominated intervention debates until August/September, when discussions of 












































Rwanda in Summary 
The findings of this study revealed some interesting angles from which the conflict in Rwanda 
was reported. Print media from the US, UK and Australia consistently reported the conflict as 
a complicated battle between “ethnic groups”, with heavy use of “native” and “tribal” 
language. Media also avoided identifying a specific perpetrator and victim in the situation, 
regularly grouping warring factions together as equal aggressors. While “victims” in general 
were portrayed, and empathy for them evoked, these victims were vaguely identified as 
“Rwandans” – without reference to specific sides of the conflict. This in turn prompted little 
reference to the need for intervention from outside parties – a prospect that was not debated 
heavily in the media. In light of what is now recognised as genocide of the Tutsi people, it is 
interesting to note that the Tutsi military and leaders received more coverage as “aggressors” 
than their Hutu counterparts in the early stages for the conflict.  
4.2 Kosovo 
Kosovo in Context 
In 1991, 90 per cent of the population of Kosovo identified themselves as Albanian, with only 
10 per cent identifying as Serbian (McGwire, 2000: 78-80). While Albania had traditionally 
resisted inclusion into Yugoslavia, it held a desire to unite with Kosovo – a move that was 
contested by Serbia, which controlled Kosovo at the time. Kosovo became a particularly 
controversial region when Serbian national sentiment peaked, as the region held emotional 
attachment to Serbians throughout Yugoslavia (Cottey, 2009: 594; Hayden, 1996: 783). 
Slobodan Milosevic rose to power in Serbia with promises to support the Serbian minority in 
Kosovo (Cottey, 2009: 594; Kempf, 1999: 2) and followed through by revoking Kosovo’s 
autonomy. In September 1990, Kosovo Albanians responded by declaring independence. 
Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo (DLK) was elected president in 
a secret referendum (McGwire, 2000: 78-80). Rugova offered passive resistance to Belgrade 
rule, but after many years of not achieving the goal of independence through non-violence 
(while other regions of Yugoslavia achieved independence through war), the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) emerged as an alternative solution (McGwire, 2000: 78-80). In late 
February Serbian forces launched an initial counter-offensive and a major counter-offensive 
in the summer of 1998, driving back the KLA and burning Kosovo villages, and consequently 
engaging the first significant international media attention (McGwire, 2000: 78-80; Bahador, 
2007). International pressure ensued, primarily from the US, to negotiate agreements between 
Milosevic and the KLA. 
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When NATO decided to intervene in the Kosovo conflict in March 1999, it was politically 
portrayed as a way to avert a humanitarian disaster and ethnic cleansing by reducing the 
capability of Serbian forces to repress the Kosovar Albanians (Kuusisto, 1999; McGwire, 
2000: 76; Goodman, 2006: 108). Action in Kosovo was justified with a heroic narrative, 
described in mainstream media as a just war, punishing an evil dictator and saving innocent 
people (Iordanova, 2001: 826; Kuusisto, 1999). This justification has, like that of the 
Rwandan conflict, been criticised for the over-simplification of a very complex conflict, 
stemming back to the failed state of Yugoslavia (Clemens, 1992: 694; Iordanova, 2001: 826; 
Sremac, 1999; Kuusisto, 1999). The term “multi-ethnic civil war”, used to describe the 
situation, missed the full complexity of the violence in Kosovo (McGwire, 2000: 77; Allen 
and Seaton, 1999; Kuusisto, 1999).  
Constant reference to this “ethnic” divide and the black-and-white players that emerged in 
international media when covering Kosovo was a key focus of this study. The following 
sections examine the way in which the conflict was represented to “the West”. 
Kosovo Results 
Actor 
In this conflict, “side A” refers to the Serbian ethnic group, while “side B” refers to the 
Kosovo Albanian ethnic group. The Serbian government was identified as “side A” leaders, 
while the KLA and Ibrahim Rugova were both coded as “side B” leaders/military. Table 9 
summarises how often each of the relevant actors was identified in the UOAs. 
Table 9: Actors Identified in References, Kosovo 
Actor Kosovo 
  
Side A military or leaders (Serbian gov./forces) 32.3% 
Side A people (Serbians) 1.8% 
Side B military/leaders (Rugova, KLA) 18.0% 
Side B people (Kosovo Albanians) 13.8% 
Both sides or country in general 7.7% 
Unidentified rebels or militia 0.0% 





Within coverage leading up to the NATO intervention in Kosovo, the prime focus of 
international media was Side A: Slobodan Milosevic and the Serbian forces. A third of the 
references covering the conflict focused on Milosevic and the Serbian police, and another 
quarter examined the international community’s role in the situation. The region in general, or 
both sides of the conflict together, were rarely mentioned, with very distinct sides being 
identified in the conflict. The media never referred to unidentified rebels, each attack or battle 
had specific, recognisable forces. Side B people, Kosovo Albanians, featured more heavily 
than their Side A counterparts, but not as frequently as Side A leaders and military – in this 
conflict, Milosevic was centre stage. Table 10 examines how these actors were described.  











      
Side A leaders (Milosevic) 0.0% 21.1% 0.0% 78.9% 100% 
Side A people (Serbians) 0.0% 30.8% 7.7% 61.5% 100% 
Side B leaders (Rugova, KLA) 0.0% 32.3% 1.6% 66.1% 100% 
Side B people (Kos. Albanians) 0.0% 62.9% 13.4% 23.7% 100% 
Both sides/Yugoslavia  0.0% 33.3% 3.7% 63.0% 100% 
Unidentified rebels or militia 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100% 
International community 0.0% 1.1% 0.0% 98.9% 100% 
 
Within the media coverage of the Kosovo conflict Milosevic and the Serbian police were 
portrayed as the “villains” of the situation. Of the 45 times their character was described, all 
of them contained negative attributes. The descriptions used included terms such as “brutal”, 
“defiant”, “ruthless”, “murderous”, “stubborn”, “false” and “lying”. The Serbian people also 
received “negative” coverage, although not as completely as Serbian forces, with descriptions 
of “old enmities”, but the character of the Serbian people was only discussed five times, so 
the results are based on very little framing. Far more prominent was the character description 
of Side B people, the Kosovo Albanians. They received 74 character references, with what 
appears to be an overwhelmingly negative representation. However, this “negative” includes 
15 references to “villages” and “villagers”, as a distancing reference – readers would not 
relate to living in villages, and these terms were classified as “othering”. Constant reference to 
Kosovo Albanians as an “ethnic” group (43 of the 74 character descriptions) was also coded a 
negative, as the term distanced the conflict as an ethnic battle, rather than political or 
economic.  Over 13 per cent of the character references for Kosovo Albanians highlighted 
similarities with the reader, with six mentions of “civilians” (rather than “villagers”), and 
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several references to family values. This description of the Kosovo Albanians as divided by 
ethnic ties, and living in villages may act as a distancing element in the media, but should also 
be taken into consideration with the role they were described to have played in the conflict. 
The actor’s roles are summarised in Table 11.  









      
Side A leaders (Milosevic) 74.7% 44.2% 11.1% 8.8% 3.3% 
Side A people (Serbians) 3.4% 0.9% 11.1% 0.0% 4.1% 
Side B leaders (Rugova, KLA) 15.1% 32.1% 0.0% 10.7% 9.8% 
Side B people (Kos. Albanians) 2.1% 2.8% 11.1% 0.6% 66.4% 
Both sides or country in general 4.8% 7.4% 0.0% 2.5% 14.8% 
Unidentified rebels or militia 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
International community 0.0% 12.6% 66.7% 77.4% 1.6% 
      
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Of all the actors discussed in the media during the lead-up to intervention in Kosovo, 
Milosevic and his forces were again a main focus. Portrayed as the overwhelming aggressive 
force in the war, Side A’s military and leaders were again identified as the “villain” of the 
situation, with the most “aggressor” and “preventing peace” references of all the parties 
involved. Side B, which included the KLA, were represented as preventing peace and 
sometimes acting as the aggressors, but not nearly as frequently as the Serbian side. As well 
as a clearly identifiable “bad guy” in the conflict, a well-defined “victim” emerged as the Side 
B people, the Kosovo Albanians. While some reference was made to the region in general, or 
both side’s people, being victims, 66.4 per cent of references to victims were attributed to the 
Kosovo Albanians. So, with a clear villain and victim established, was there any mention of a 
hero? Table 12 summarises the suggestions for internal and external parties in the conflict. 
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Table 12: Actions Proposed for External Parties, Kosovo 
Actions proposed (internal and external parties) Kosovo 
  
Internal parties should sort it out themselves 4.0% 
Internal parties should seek peace/victory with intervention 34.0% 
N/A for Internal parties 62.0% 
 100% 
Outsiders must NOT intervene 3.4% 
Outsiders must be cautious 6.8% 
Non-violently stop conflict (diplomats etc) 33.8% 
Stop conflict through intervention/military action 18.9% 
N/A for External parties 37.2% 
 100% 
 
Over half of the references made concerning the Kosovo conflict called for some kind of 
intervention, diplomatic or military, with very few calls to refrain from intervening or for 
remaining cautious about intervening. In representations of the Kosovo conflict, it appears 
that the potential for a “hero” was well established. Suggestions for internal parties were not 
common, but when they were made, they were in favour of some kind of outside intervention 
– mainly in the form of diplomats facilitating negotiations. Proposed actions for external 
parties also heavily favoured facilitating negotiations, which fits the context of the conflict – 
much of the onset of intervention comprised of international pressure being applied to 
Belgrade and attempts to bring Milosevic and the KLA to some agreement.  
The suggested actions can be further analysed according to the three newspapers chosen for 
this study, to identify any differences between the USA, Australia and UK news sources 
(Table 13). 















       
New York Times 1.6% 3.3% 34.4% 26.2% 34.4% 100% 
The Times 8.1% 13.1% 28.1% 12.7% 38.0% 100% 
Sydney Morning Herald 0.8% 4.6% 38.3% 17.1% 39.2% 100% 
 
All three newspapers appeared to report the Kosovo conflict as a war worthy of intervention, 
with more support in each paper for non-military intervention in the lead-up to NATO’s 
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decision to bomb Serbian forces. The New York Times stories promoted the use of force 
more than its Australian and UK counterparts, with 26.2 per cent of its coverage reporting 
calls for military intervention as opposed to The Time’s 12.7 per cent and the Sydney 
Morning Herald’s 17.1 per cent. The Times also reported more calls for caution and restraint 
than the other two newspapers.  
Calls for Intervention over Time 
While Kosovo was framed overall as a case worthy of intervention, the intervention debate 
was played out in the media over a period of time. Figure 3 charts calls for intervention in the 
year prior to NATO’s attacks on Serbian forces. 
 
Figure 3: Calls for Intervention into Kosovo 
 
While the intervention debate played out in Western media varied greatly in the year leading 
up to military intervention in Kosovo, one call remained prominent throughout the year – that 
of diplomatic intervention. Only in September, and November 1998, did calls for full military 
intervention rank the highest in news reports, with the rest of the coverage suggesting 
diplomatic negotiations and solutions. Even as plans for military intervention were solidified 
in March 1999, calls for diplomatic intervention were still the most dominant in media 
coverage, although warnings against intervention dropped away during that time. Compared 
to the suggestion for diplomatic solutions, little resistance to intervention was proposed in 



































































































 Kosovo in Summary 
The conflict in Kosovo, prior to intervention, was reported as distinctly having two “sides”. 
On one side, Milosevic and the Serbian forces were portrayed as villains and aggressors, 
while the Kosovo Albanian population were reported as innocent victims. Kosovo Albanians 
also received a substantial amount of coverage through empathy frames – with their 
similarities to the readers often highlighted. Another distinct “side” of the conflict was that of 
the “side B” leaders and military – which was portrayed largely as preventing peace, rather 
than as being aggressive. The media coverage portrayed the assumption that the various 
groups comprising the Balkans have always fought each other, despite this attitude already 
being academically criticised – Yugoslavia was not always dominated by ethnic divisions, 
and was, until the 1990s, operating as a mixed society in a relative stable situation (Hayden, 
1996: 786; Crawford and Lipschutz, 1998: 197). In media coverage of Kosovo there was a 
strong emphasis on diplomatic intervention, with a noticeable number of calls for 
international sanctions and facilitation. Calls for military intervention also featured heavily, 
but were less frequent than calls for diplomatic intervention. Kosovo was, therefore, portrayed 
as a situation worthy of intervention from the global community.  
4.3 East Timor 
East Timor in Context 
The conflict that preceded an Australian-led intervention in East Timor in 1999 had been 
ongoing for over 20 years. When Portugal withdrew from its former colony in the mid-1970s, 
East Timor’s independence was short-lived, with Indonesian troops moving in swiftly to 
occupy the territory – an annexation that was never recognised by the United Nations (Cotton, 
2001: 132). Since then, pro-independence fighters had risen and fallen in East Timor, with 
varying amounts of international attention to the situation. In 1996 two Timorese 
independence leaders won Nobel Peace Prizes for their struggle, and the release of 
information regarding the killing of Western journalists during Indonesian attacks attracted 
the world media. In 1997, Indonesian President B.J. Habibie agreed to allow East Timor to 
hold a referendum to decide its fate, much to the chagrin of others in the Indonesian 
parliament and ruling class (Kuperman, 1999: 10). Militia violence followed, with a post-
ballot outbreak of massacres (Orford, 2003: 1) and in September 1999 the UN Security 
Council authorised multinational force to be sent to East Timor to address concerns for the 
"systematic, widespread and flagrant violations” of international humanitarian and human 
rights law that were occurring (Cotton, 2001: 127, 130).  
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Some human-rights groups and political analysts have blamed “25 years of Western coddling 
of Indonesia” for the massacres that occurred in the later part of the conflict (Kuperman, 
1999: 10, also see Herman and Chomsky, 2002). Others have argued that it was too much of 
the wrong sort of international pressure on Jakarta, without consideration for repercussions on 
the ground, which escalated the violence (Kuperman, 1999: 10). Regardless of the 
exacerbating factors, the conflict, and the intervention which followed, was closely watched 
by international media, especially in Australia (Orford, 2003: 1). This study examined the 
way in which East Timor was discussed, and the extent to which this conflict was represented 
as an “ethnic” conflict. 
East Timor Results 
Table 14 summarises the amount of coverage each of the identified actors received in the East 
Timor conflict. 





Side A military/leaders (Indonesian gov/forces) 31.2% 
Side A people (Indonesians) 0.8% 
Side B military/leaders (East Timorese forces/leaders) 6.6% 
Side B people (East Timorese) 19.5% 
Both sides or country in general 8.6% 
Unidentified rebels or militia 6.6% 




Prior to intervention in East Timor, media coverage focused on Side A military and leaders 
(the Indonesian government and army) more than any other actor. Almost one third of the 
references made concerning the conflict, 31.2 per cent, concentrated on the Indonesian 
military and leaders. Another quarter, 26.7 per cent, focused on the international community’s 
response to the conflict. Side B people (the East Timorese) received a high 19.5 per cent of 
coverage, while Side B military and leaders received very little comparative coverage. Table 
15 examines how these actors were described. 
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Side A leaders (Indones. Gov.) 0.0% 31.3% 0.6% 68.1% 100% 
Side A people (Indonesians) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100% 
Side B leaders (East Timor) 0.0% 5.9% 23.5% 70.6% 100% 
Side B people (East Timorese) 0.0% 11.0% 14.0% 75.0% 100% 
Both sides/country in general 0.0% 15.9% 11.4% 72.7% 100% 
Unidentified rebels or militia 2.9% 29.4% 0.0% 67.6% 100% 
International community 0.0% 5.1% 0.7% 94.2% 100% 
 
While the Indonesian authorities were a focus of the media, the coverage describing their 
characteristics was largely negative, with 31.3 per cent of the references to the government 
including negative attributes, such as “mad”, “abusive”, “brutal”, and several references to 
lying or deceiving others. In this conflict, the Side B people (the East Timorese) received 
more favourable coverage than negative, with 14 per cent of references highlighting a positive 
attribute. These attributes included several mentions of “bravery”, “friendship”, and 
supportive of “democracy”. The “negative” characteristics attributed to the East Timorese 
people were usually references to primitive living conditions, such as “villages” and “refugee” 
status – distancing the actor from the reader. These characteristics should be taken into 
consideration in conjunction with the roles each of the actors, which can be examined in 
Table 16. 
Table 16: Role of Actors in East Timor Conflict* 






      
Side A leaders (Indones. Gov.) 60.7% 60.8% 21.8% 0.0% 9.1% 
Side A people (Indonesians) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.5% 2.3% 
Side B leaders (East Timor) 2.8% 6.2% 11.3% 5.0% 6.8% 
Side B people (East Timorese) 0.9% 1.0% 6.3% 66.1% 18.2% 
Both sides or country in general 3.7% 3.1% 1.4% 14.0% 40.9% 
Unidentified rebels or militia 31.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
International community 0.0% 28.9% 59.2% 12.4% 22.7% 
      
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
*Note: The “forced to act” role was removed from this table as it contained only 2 UOAs. 
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The Indonesian government and army were firmly identified as the primary aggressor of the 
conflict. With 60.7 per cent of references to aggressors, and 60.8 per cent of references to 
preventing peace attributed to the Indonesian leaders and military, they were clearly identified 
in the media as the “bad guys”. The East Timorese people were clearly defined as the victims 
in the situation, with 66.1 per cent of references to victims applying to them. The region of 
East Timor in general was also identified as a victim of the situation, as was the international 
community, largely due to a series of attacks on UN personnel. Side B leaders were 
represented as promoting peace more than any other role, as was the international community. 
The international community also received some coverage coded as “preventing peace” 
because of claims that other nations had previously ignored the conflict and were delaying 
intervention into atrocities that were occurring. Suggestions for intervention that were 
identified in the UOAs are summarised in Table 17, which highlights the proposed actions for 
internal and external parties.  
Table 17: Actions Proposed for Internal Parties, East Timor 
Actions proposed (internal and external parties) East Timor 
  
Internal parties should sort it out themselves 5.3% 
Internal parties should seek peace/victory with intervention 18.9% 
N/A for Internal parties 75.8% 
 100% 
Outsiders must NOT intervene 2.9% 
Outsiders must be cautious 8.0% 
Non-violently stop conflict (diplomats etc) 18.5% 
Stop conflict through intervention/military action 26.1% 
N/A for External parties 44.4% 
 100% 
 
The most common suggestion made for internal parties in East Timor was to accept 
intervention. Although, 75.8 per cent of references to East Timor did not discuss any solutions 
for internal parties – the focus was largely on how the outside world would respond. Here, 
more than half of the references to East Timor discussed intervention – with 26.1 per cent in 
favour of military intervention. This out-ranked calls for diplomatic solutions (at 18.5 per 
cent). With 44.6 per cent of references calling for some kind of intervention, military or 
otherwise, this conflict was clearly framed as one worthy of international intervention. The 
suggested actions can be further analysed according to the three newspapers, to identify any 
differences between the USA, Australia and UK news sources (Table 18). 
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New York Times 3.6% 5.1% 15.8% 24.5% 51.0% 100% 
The Times 2.8% 4.9% 11.1% 32.6% 48.6% 100% 
Sydney Morning Herald 2.3% 13.9% 27.7% 22.5% 33.5% 100% 
 
These finding show that, of the three newspapers, the Sydney Morning Herald reported the 
most calls for caution regarding intervention into East Timor – which is understandable given 
Australia’s strong economic ties with, and geographical proximity to, Indonesia. The Sydney 
Morning Herald also discussed diplomatic solutions more than its UK and USA counterparts. 
The Times and the New York Times represented East Timor as more of a case for military 
intervention, with The Times reporting pro-intervention calls in a third of its total references 
made to the conflict. 
Calls for Intervention over Time 
While the situation in East Timor was represented as a case worthy of intervention, it was 
framed very differently in the month prior to intervention than it had been in the year before 
foreign troops landed on Timor soil. Figure 4 charts the changes in calls for international 
intervention in the lead-up to September 1999.  
 
































































































The debate over intervention into East Timor did not feature heavily in news reports of the 
situation until the beginning of 1999, when calls for military and diplomatic intervention 
dominated. From April to August 1999, diplomatic intervention was favoured in media 
coverage of East Timor. However, between August 1999 and the intervention the next month, 
the intervention debate heated up on all sides. During this period calls for military 
intervention sky-rocketed, and were more than twice as common as suggestions for 
diplomatic solutions. The opposition leader in Australia at the time, Kim Beazley, declared 
this steep increase of public support for intervention – demonstrated through numerous 
protests against Indonesia – as “the most inspiring event he had witnessed” (Orford, 2003: 1).  
East Timor in Summary 
The conflict in East Timor was covered in Western media as a battle between two distinct 
sides. The Indonesian government and military forces were described as an abusive regime 
which could not be trusted to keep promises of peace, while the East Timorese people were 
portrayed as clear victims in the situation. The international community was under scrutiny 
for most of the conflict, while little focus was placed on East Timorese leaders/military. The 
international community’s role in East Timor featured in media coverage almost as much as 
the Indonesian government and the situation was represented as a clear case not just for 
intervention, but specifically for military intervention. A major push in the media for military 
intervention was noted in the month prior to intervention, when calls for foreign troops to 
intervene significantly increased.  
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    Chapter 5                                                                    
Rwanda, Kosovo and East Timor: 
Comparing the Three Conflicts 
Media framing of each conflict to the Western world revealed some interesting findings, 
however, the differences between representations of the three wars further revealed 
enlightening contrasts. This section compares the findings from all three conflicts, to further 
explore the differences and similarities in the way the conflicts were portrayed.  
5.1 Centre-stage: How Media Focus Differs in Each Conflict 
The difference between the Rwandan conflict and the interventions into Kosovo and East 
Timor can be understood within the context in which they were presented to the outside 
world. The focus of international media was different in the three wars, with Rwanda standing 
out as the exception. Table 19 highlights the actors on whom Western media focused  within 
each conflict. 
Table 19: Actors Identified in References 
Actor Rwanda Kosovo East Timor 
    
Side A military or leaders 14.8% 32.3% 31.2% 
Side A people 2.5% 1.8% 0.8% 
Side B military or leaders 13.8% 18.0% 6.6% 
Side B people 2.8% 13.8% 19.5% 
Both sides or country in general 34.3% 7.7% 8.6% 
Unidentified rebels or militia 2.1% 0.0% 6.6% 
International community 29.7% 26.4% 26.7% 
    
Total 100% 100% 100% 
 
The leaders of “Side A” (authority or military) in both Kosovo and East Timor were the 
dominant focus of Western media. Stories on the Kosovo conflict highlighted Slobodan 
Milošević and the Serbian forces active in the region, while the Indonesian government and 
army were the main actors in articles referring to the East Timor conflict. This focus on Side 
A in Kosovo and East Timor is important when compared to the Rwandan conflict. In the 
African country’s conflict, it was the country of Rwanda in general, or both Side A (Hutu-
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dominated government) and Side B (Rwandan Patriotic Front) which was referred to in the 
international media.  
Both the Kosovo and East Timor conflicts were represented as clearly divided cases, with 
easily identifiable ethnic divides. Rarely was the region described as a whole, or both sides of 
the conflict discussed together – both leaders and people were separated, and audiences were 
expected to understand these differences. “Ethnic Albanians”, “Serbian police”, “Indonesian 
army”, and “East Timorese” all provided well-defined players for the international media to 
focus on. Serbian people living in Kosovo, or Indonesians living in East Timor were largely 
ignored in the West’s need to simplify stories. Rwanda however, was more complicated for 
Western media. The dismissal of Rwanda as “yet another African squabble” (Dowden, 2004) 
was evident in media’s reluctance to identify sides. For the larger part of the conflict, 
participants were described generally as “Rwandans” – despite the establishment of two 
ethnic groups and the Rwandan Patriotic Front opposing a recognised Hutu-led Rwandan 
government. While this has been argued to be the fault of limited access to information on the 
ground (Dowden, 2004), Kosovo was also restricted, as were parts of East Timor. When 
media did eventually delve into the Rwandan conflict, the war was described in terms of 
equally primitive “tribes”, with both Hutu and Tutsi tribes mentioned in the same reference. 
If, as some theorists suggest, a delay in international intervention is a result of failing to 
identify a clear perpetrator who needs to be punished (Walzer, 2004: 71) – then this study’s 
findings support such arguments. The relative focus on Side B’s people in Kosovo and East 
Timor (Kosovo and East Timorese civilians), compared to Side A’s people, supports this 
theory – if a “bad guy” was established, a victim was also required for the narrative. Rwanda 
was again, a far less clear-cut case, with very little mention of the Tutsi population that 
suffered what is now understood to be one of the world’s more horrific genocides.  
In all three conflicts, and especially in the Rwandan conflict, the role of the international 
community featured heavily. This can be attributed to constant reflections from governments, 
experts and NGOs on whether or not the international community had a role to play in the 
conflict. This indicates that, regardless of the conflict, Western media remains fixated on the 
role of the international community, rather than those in conflict (Wolfsfeld, 2004).  
However, as was the case in Rwanda and to some extent Kosovo and East Timor, the amount 
of coverage allocated to a conflict or actor, did not necessarily mean swift intervention. Part 
of the explanation for this is the tone of coverage, and the way in which actors were 
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described. This study compared the adjectives used to describe actors in each conflict, and 
these results are discussed in the next section. 
5.2 Not Just Quantity but Quality: Are Actors Portrayed Differently 
in Each Conflict? 
While a purely objective media would dictate that adjectives are prohibited in fair and 
accurate reporting of a conflict, this is not always the case. Many appear in editorials and 
letters to the editor, but a surprising amount of subjective descriptions arise in “hard news” 
articles as well. Table 20 highlights the extent to which actors were described as having 
negative or positive attributes. 








Actor Rwanda Kosovo East Timor Rwanda Kosovo East Timor 
       
Side A military or leaders 16.4% 27.6% 57.5% 5.6% 0.0% 3.4% 
Side A people 2.5% 2.3% 0.0% 0.0% 5.6% 0.0% 
Side B military or leaders 11.3% 23.6% 2.3% 11.1% 11.1% 27.6% 
Side B people 1.9% 35.1% 12.6% 0.0% 72.2% 48.3% 
Both sides/country in general 63.5% 10.3% 8.0% 38.9% 11.1% 17.2% 
Unidentified rebels or militia 3.1% 0.0% 11.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
International community 1.3% 1.1% 8.0% 44.4% 0.0% 3.4% 
       
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
*The “character” coding section of this study also measured non-human characteristics (such as references to 
animal behaviour), but as only three references appeared that section has been omitted in the table above.  
 
The leaders of Side A in both Kosovo and East Timor (Serbian military/Milošević and the 
Indonesian government) were frequently represented as possessing negative characteristics. 
Example of the adjectives used include (in order of frequency):  “brutal”, “lying”, “thug-like” 
and “vicious”. In Kosovo, Side B’s leaders/military were described in a similarly negative 
fashion, but this was overshadowed by the focus on the Side B people (Kosovo Albanians). 
The side B people were portrayed in a negative frame – largely because of constant reference 
to “ethnic” Kosovo Albanians, which, as discussed previously, was coded within a 
distancing/inferior frame from the reader. The coverage of Rwanda, in contrast, saw very little 
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difference in roles between the Hutu military/leaders and the Tutsi military/leaders. In that 
particular conflict, it was the country’s people in general which were discussed as having 
negative characteristics – both sides of the conflict were reported as “as bad as” the other.  
The East Timor findings showed the clearest distinction between warring factions. The 
Indonesian government was portrayed negatively, while the pro-independence East Timorese 
leaders were described in a significantly more positive frame than the side B categories of 
Kosovo or Rwanda. References to East Timorese leaders receiving Nobel Peace Prizes and 
positive support meant that side B in this conflict was often described as “media darlings”. 
When it came to positive characteristics of people, again Rwanda was understood as a whole, 
with no references to either Hutu or Tutsi people falling under a positive frame, only empathy 
for “Rwandans” as a nation. The coverage of Kosovo, however, saw powerful empathy 
framing for the Kosovo Albanians, and East Timor saw dominant coverage of the East 
Timorese in a positive frame.  
This study also examined the representation of the role each actor played in the conflict, with 
noticeable differences arising between actors. Table 21 summarises the roles identified for 
these actors, separated by conflict for comparison between the three wars.  
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Table 21: Actors’ Role in Conflict 
 
Actor  Rwanda Kosovo East Timor 
     
Side A military or leaders Aggressors 54.8% 48.9% 41.7% 
 Preventing, delaying peace 9.6% 42.6% 37.8% 
 Forced to act or misled 0.0% 0.4% 0.6% 
 Promoting peace 12.3% 6.3% 19.9% 
 Victims 23.3% 1.8% 0.0% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
     
Side B military or leaders Aggressors 76.1% 18.3% 9.7% 
 Preventing, delaying peace 4.5% 57.5% 19.4% 
 Forced to act or misled 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 Promoting peace 19.4% 14.2% 51.6% 
 Victims 0.0% 10.0% 19.4% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
     
Side A people Aggressors 46% 38% 1.1% 
 Preventing, delaying peace 0.0% 15% 1.1% 
 Forced to act or misled 0.0% 8% 1.1% 
 Promoting peace 0% 0% 75% 
 Victims 54% 38% 25% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
     
Side B people Aggressors 13.3% 3.3% 1.1% 
 Preventing, delaying peace 0.0% 6.5% 1.1% 
 Forced to act or misled 0.0% 1.1% 1.1% 
 Promoting peace 0.0% 1.1% 9.8% 
 Victims 86.7% 88.0% 87.0% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
     
Both sides or country in 
general 
Aggressors 21.4% 15.6% 15.4% 
 Preventing, delaying peace 1.5% 35.6% 11.5% 
 Forced to act or misled 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 Promoting peace 2.3% 8.9% 7.7% 
 Victims 74.8% 40.0% 65.4% 




The roles of victim and villain were again far more distinct in media coverage of Kosovo and 
East Timor than that of Rwanda. Side A leaders and military were portrayed in a negative 
light, with “aggressive” and “preventing peace” roles, in all three conflicts. However, in the 
coverage of Rwanda the Tutsi forces (such as the Rwandan Patriotic Front) were reported as 
being even more aggressive than Hutu militia. In Kosovo and East Timor the Side B military 
and leaders, while sometimes reported to be preventing peace, were not reported to be as 
aggressive as Side A’s military and leaders. The conflict in Rwanda was represented as an 
almost equal battle from both sides.   
In all three conflicts the Side B people (Kosovo Albanians, East Timorese and Tutsis) were 
portrayed largely as clear victims of the situation. However, in Rwanda the Tutsi people were 
also covered more frequently as aggressors. Of coverage of the Tutsi people, 13.3 per cent 
referred to them as aggressors, while Kosovo Albanians received only 3.3 per cent and the 
East Timorese received only 1.1 per cent. This indicates that while obvious victims were 
established in coverage of Kosovo and East Timor, Rwandan victims were more difficult to 
identify, with the victims’ “innocence” in the conflict sometimes questioned.  
In examining the amount of times the two sides in conflict were framed together in the same 
way, the contrast between the conflicts becomes even more obvious. Rwandans in general 
received a large amount of coverage as victims, with an outpouring of sympathy in Western 
media for the victims of atrocities in the country, but the atrocities were rarely attributed to 
one side or another. The East Timorese in general were also framed as victims but this still 
identified the East Timorese as separate to the Indonesian population – they were a clearly 
defined group of victims. This understanding of the Rwandan conflict as a general battle, 
without clear and separable victims (as East Timor and Kosovo had) may go some way to 
explaining the international community’s reluctance to intervene, as the portrayal of Rwanda 
reflects concepts of a “native battle” too engrained for Western nations to wade into.  
Table 22 examines suggestions made for external actors during the lead-up to intervention. 














      
Rwanda 23.1% 17.3% 33.1% 26.5% 100% 
Kosovo 5.4% 10.8% 53.7% 30.0% 100% 
East Timor 5.3% 14.4% 33.3% 47.0% 100% 
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Rwanda received the greatest proportion of calls for specific non-intervention, despite 
empathy framing for the general “victims” involved. Even when mention of intervention was 
made, it was with suggestions of diplomatic facilitation or humanitarian aid, rather than 
military peace-keeping forces. Perhaps even more tellingly, and which is not indicated in the 
table above, is that less than half of the references to Rwanda (49.2 per cent), contained 
suggestion of the international community having a role to play (see Table 7). This is lower 
than the coverage of Kosovo and East Timor, where 62 per cent and 55 per cent of references, 
respectively, debated the possibility of intervention. 
In Kosovo and East Timor, calls for intervention were more frequent, although surprisingly 
different. While a villain-victim representation was evident in the coverage of Kosovo, this 
did not appear to lead to calls for an all-out military intervention. Rather, these portrayals 
more frequently lead to calls for international intervention in the form of diplomatic 
facilitation. East Timor however was covered with a strong suggestion of military 
intervention, despite heavy diplomatic pressure being applied to the Indonesian government at 
the time. These differences can be understood in context, with frequent references to peace 
treaties being made in the lead-up to the Kosovo intervention, and less in East Timor.  
Further investigation into the kinds of roles mentioned in all three conflicts show that 
portrayal of “aggressors”, rather than “victims” prompts stronger suggestions for international 
intervention. This is shown in Table 23. 














      
Aggressors 14.8% 7.8% 29.7% 47.7% 100% 
Preventing  peace 10.8% 12.0% 38.2% 39.0% 100% 
Forced to act or misled 66.7% 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 100% 
Promoting peace 1.8% 11.0% 52.3% 34.9% 100% 
Victims 6.1% 4.3% 52.4% 37.2% 100% 
N/A 21.6% 32.7% 32.7% 12.9% 100% 
 
When “aggressors” and “victims” are mentioned in media coverage of the three conflicts, 
calls for international intervention are significantly increased – supporting the concept of a 
villain-hero-victim narrative requirement for support of intervention. Mention of victims 
prompts frequent calls for non-violent assistance (humanitarian aid, diplomatic facilitation), 
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while mention of “aggressors” encourages a stronger reaction (military intervention). This 
would suggest that while identification of a “victim” prompts pity, it is the identification of a 
“villain” (and therefore possibility of a “hero”), which prompts calls for full military 
intervention.  
5.3 Dissention Amongst the Ranks: Do the Newspapers Differ? 
As well as examining the representation of conflicts, this study found subtle differences 
between the US, UK and Australian newspapers studied. Table 24 shows the suggestions for 
the internal actors of the country in conflict, divided by newspaper. 
Table 24: Suggestions for Internal Parties, Divided by Newspaper 
Rwanda 





     
New York Times 8.4% 7.4% 84.2% 100% 
The Times 13.8% 8.4% 77.8% 100% 
Sydney Morning Herald 10.3% 2.1% 87.7% 100% 
 
 
    
Kosovo 





     
New York Times 2.9% 33.6% 63.5% 100% 
The Times 8.6% 28.5% 62.9% 100% 
Sydney Morning Herald 0.8% 39.6% 59.6% 100% 
 
 
    
East Timor 





     
New York Times 5.6% 19.5% 74.9% 100% 
The Times 2.1% 17.4% 80.6% 100% 
Sydney Morning Herald 7.5% 19.7% 72.8% 100% 
 
During the build-up of the Rwandan conflict, all three newspapers included more suggestions 
for non-intervention than intervention. All three reported more references to the internal 
parties “sorting it out themselves”, rather than looking for international intervention, with the 
Sydney Morning Herald presenting the strongest case for non-intervention. 10.3 per cent of 
references to Rwanda in the Sydney Morning Herald suggested internal solutions, while only 
2.1 per cent suggested external intervention. The N/A section in these findings are also 
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relevant, as they highlight that very little discussion concerning the internal parties abilities to 
resolve the conflict were discussed in Western media. In each newspaper, between 77 and 88 
per cent of articles discussing Rwanda did not suggest internal solutions. This figure is 
noticeably lower in both the Kosovo and East Timor conflicts. Also, in contrast to the 
Rwandan conflict, suggestions for internal parties in both Kosovo and East Timor – when 
discussed – leaned heavily towards some form of intervention, especially in the lead-up to the 
Kosovo intervention.  Table 25 further reflects these attitudes in suggestions for external 
parties. 

















       
New York Times 8.8% 4.7% 9.8% 11.2% 65.6% 100% 
The Times 19.2% 9.6% 18.6% 13.8% 38.9% 100% 
















       
New York Times 1.6% 3.3% 34.4% 26.2% 34.4% 100% 
The Times 8.1% 13.1% 28.1% 12.7% 38.0% 100% 


















       
New York Times 3.6% 5.1% 15.8% 24.5% 51.0% 100% 
The Times 2.8% 4.9% 11.1% 32.6% 48.6% 100% 
Syd. Morn. Herald 2.3% 13.9% 27.7% 22.5% 33.5% 100% 
       
In suggestions for actions to be taken by the international community, here the Times was 
more reluctant to report support for intervention in Rwanda, and the New York Times did not 
even debate the possibility in more than half of the references to Rwanda (65.6 per cent).  In 
Kosovo, the US and Australian papers provided more suggestions of some form of 
intervention than The Times, with The Times suggesting more caution than the other papers, 
although all three again framed the conflict as a case worthy of intervention overall. In East 
Timor, the US paper was less suggestive, again only discussing the international community’s 
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role for half of the references, while The Times’ stories were more pro-intervention. The 
Sydney Morning Herald suggested non-military intervention more than its counterparts, 
explainable again because of Australia’s tenuous relationship with Indonesia.   
The obvious difference between the media’s response to Rwanda and the other two conflicts 
goes to the heart of this study – why were calls of intervention fewer in the coverage of 
Rwanda than that of Kosovo and East Timor? The explanation, this study shows, is in the 
framing of the conflicts. The following chapter further explains this, and the implications of 
this study’s findings. 
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    Chapter 6                                                              
Conclusions  
This study identified several trends in Western print media in the portrayal of “ethnic” 
conflicts, prior to potential intervention. The findings reveal that the answer to this thesis’ 
main question, “Does Western media framing of different actors in ethnic conflict influence 
the likelihood of intervention being advocated in the media?”, is, put simply: yes. This study 
indicated that media framing of the different actors in ethnic conflict has a strong influence on 
the possibility of intervention being promoted through media sources. In order to address this 
question further, this chapter discusses whether or not the findings of this study support the 
hypotheses: 
1) When ethnic conflicts are framed as “barbaric” situations (involving heroes, victims 
and villains), intervention is promoted in the media.  
2) When ethnic conflicts are framed as “native” situations (stemming from ancient 
hatreds), at least one of the three players – heroes, victims or villains – is missing, and 
intervention is not promoted. 
6.1 The “Ethnic” Conflict Framework 
The situations in Kosovo, East Timor and Rwanda were, as much of the literature suggests, 
understood as “ethnic” conflicts – produced by “ancient hatreds” and part of a “deep-rooted” 
problem. This study found that very little focus was placed on external, political or economic 
contributions to the conflict, with the media’s portrayal of the violence in all three cases as an 
“ethnic” problem. Frequent references to the “ethnic hatred” in Kosovo, the “tribal 
massacres” in Rwanda and the “barbaric” atrocities in East Timor were noted.  The concerns 
of political theorists regarding the simplification of conflicts were expressed in the literature 
review (see Kuperman, 2004; Orford: 2003; Allen and Seaton eds, 1999; Crawford and 
Lipschutz, eds, 1998) and this study found that these particular conflicts were indeed reduced 
to “ethnic” wars in mainstream media. Furthermore, media coverage of the wars in Kosovo, 
East Timor and Rwanda reduced the violence into two different kinds of ethnic conflict: 
“Barbaric” or “Native”. The following summaries explain how these two categories were 
identified and address the first sub question of this thesis: What media frames are used to 
represent “barbaric” conflicts, and how do they compare to the frames used for “native” 
conflicts? 
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6.2 Exceptions for Barbarians 
The concept of a “barbaric” nation in need of intervention was evident in Western media’s 
portrayal of both Kosovo and East Timor conflicts. In both cases, this study found that the 
representation of Kosovar Albanians and East Timorese people followed the colonial 
stereotype of “helpless” victims, requiring rescue form outside forces. Frequent references to 
“villages” and “villagers” in both situations, as well as “refugees” showed a powerful 
portrayal of a primitive people in need of Western intervention to guide them towards a 
democratic state of freedom. Orford argued that the public’s desire for intervention into East 
Timor was made more urgent by the repeated representation of the Timorese as “defenceless, 
powerless, ‘hysterical’ and unprotected, and by the focus on threats to babies, women and 
children” (2003: 10). Justifications for intervening in the case of the “barbaric” have been, as 
discussed in the literature review, traced back as far as classic writing on intervention (see 
Mill for example) and became prominent in a colonial era. This study indicated that the 
West’s perceived superiority is still clearly evident in media portrayals of more recent ethnic 
conflicts. This thesis found that ethnic conflict is still identified in Western media as either a 
barbaric situation, where the West is encouraged to intervene as a “white knight”, or a native 
problem of uncivilised cultures and not worth intervening in. 
6.3 The Exception to the Exception: Natives 
Media representation of Rwanda fell into the second category of ethnic conflict: a war 
between “natives”. This study showed that the situation in Rwanda was portrayed as a 
relatively equal battle between ethnic groups, with heavy reference to “tribal” stereotypes – 
type-casting Rwanda as yet another inexplicable “native” battle. While references to “tribes” 
or “tribal” characteristics appeared regularly in reference to the Rwandan conflict, it was 
never used to describe the violence in East Timor or Kosovo; those ethnic conflicts were 
portrayed as “barbaric” situations instead. While Kosovo and East Timor received what 
Robinson would deem empathy framing concerning the people involved, Rwandan people 
were distanced from the Western reader. A dominant 64 per cent of the negative 
characteristics mentioned in reference to the Rwandan conflict were attributed evenly to both 
sides of the conflict. This study further found that the Tutsi people were never described 
solely as portraying positive characteristics, while Kosovar Albanians and East Timorese 
people were often attributed positive characteristics. The representation of Rwanda as a whole 
containing negative characteristics, and the lack of positive characteristics attributed to the 
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Tutsi population – victims of genocide – reflects a misguided attitude towards “native” 
conflicts, a case of tribal battles deemed ‘better left alone’.  
6.4 Who’s Who: The West Needs Identifiable Players 
This study’s findings clearly highlighted Western media’s reliance on identifiable characters 
in order to report support for intervention. Considering the second sub question of this study, 
What kind of media frames lead to the promotion of international intervention into ethnic 
conflicts, and what kind correlate with support for non-intervention?, this study showed that 
identifiable roles of “heroes”, “victims” and “villains” are required for media frames to 
promote intervention. Within media framing of the East Timor and Kosovo conflicts a 
prominent hero/victim/villain discourse was found, while portrayals of the Rwanda lacked 
clear identification of such groups. In coverage of Kosovo, Slobodan Milosevic and Serbian 
forces emerged as a clear “villain”, while the Indonesian government and forces were the 
obvious “bad guys” in East Timor. The Kosovar Albanians and the East Timorese were 
represented in each case as largely innocent victims, with suggestions for the international 
community to act as a “hero”. In both Kosovo and East Timor, good and bad “sides” were 
clearly labelled, with a presumed reader understanding of the opposing sides operating within 
the conflict. Both these cases went on to be represented as worthy of intervention.  
Rwanda, however, was portrayed differently. Suggestions in the media for international 
intervention into Rwanda were minimal and, in fact, most of the international peace-keeping 
or humanitarian efforts in Rwanda were heavily criticised as preventing or delaying peace, 
rather than assisting. In media representations of the Rwandan conflict, this study found that 
23.1 per cent of references specifically called for non-intervention, compared to the 5.4 and 
5.3 per cent Kosovo and East Timor received; indicating a clear difference in the way Rwanda 
was portrayed to the international community. With half of the Rwandan units of analysis 
having no reference to international intervention at all, it is obvious that the conflict was 
explained as a case for non-intervention. 
Rwanda was represented as a confusing situation, with indistinguishable actors, and little 
effort was made in the media to identify perpetrators and victims. This study found that there 
was very little mention of the Tutsi population, who suffered what is now understood to be 
one of the world’s more horrific genocides. Hutus and Tutsis were grouped together as 
“Rwandans”, refugees lacked ethnic identification, and attacks were attributed to “rebels” and 
unidentified perpetrators. Political analysts have recognised that the conflict in Rwanda failed 
to present a distinct polarisation of ethnicities between the Hutus and the Tutsis (Jacquin-
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Serdal, 1998: 131, 139; Livingston and Eachus, 1999; Ignatieff, 1998; Turton, 1997) and the 
findings of this thesis support this claim. Rwanda was a confusing war for Western media 
consumers, with both Hutu and Tutsi “sides” of the conflict consistently lumped together in 
news coverage of their roles. The West’s inability, or reluctance, to understand the 
complexities of the Rwandan conflict has been attributed to the global community failing to 
recognise the genocide (Walzer, 2004: 71; Fein, 2000), and the media has been heavily 
criticised for its role in the situation. This study found that a lack of identifiable “characters” 
hindered the media’s ability to accurately report the events, which likely contributed to the 
international community’s reluctance to intervene in the conflict in Rwanda. The impact of 
heroes, victims and villains on calls for intervention in media coverage is further explored in 
the next two sections. 
6.5 Heroes and Victims  
A powerful construct identified in this study was that of a colonial discourse of heroes and 
victims. The belief that “barbaric” nations require intervention from more “civilised” cultures 
echoes colonial attitudes towards native populations, and despite contemporary politics 
operating in a post-colonised era, this attitude prevails in media coverage of “ethnic” 
conflicts. As discussed in the literature review, many theorists have identified the hero/victim 
stereotypes displayed in intervention literature (see Orford, 2003; Barkawi, 2004; Allen and 
Seaton, 1999; Morrison, 1992; Kaplan, 1997), and this study found that Western media 
coverage of Rwanda, Kosovo and East Timor drew heavily on this imagery. 
Robinson argued that empathy for the “victim” is produced through media articles prior to 
potential intervention, resulting in direct or indirect support of such an intervention (2000). 
This study found that in media coverage of Kosovo and East Timor the majority of positive 
characteristics (part of empathy framing) were attributed to “Side B people” (Kosovar 
Albanians and East Timorese). Similarities between these people and the audience were 
regularly highlighted and readers were encouraged to feel empathy towards the actor, 
supporting Robinson’s theory.  
However, this study further expands on Robinson’s theory in the case of Rwanda. According 
to Robinson’s definitions, empathetic framing was technically achieved through the 
representation of general “victims” in Rwanda – but this study showed that these victims were 
ethnically and politically unidentified. It is important to note that the Rwandan people in 
general were still portrayed as victims, but victims from afar – to be assisted with donations 
or aid, rather than direct military intervention. For example, several mentions were made of 
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helping neighbouring African nations conduct interventions (see, for example, Lewis, New 
York Times, 01 May 1994) and a large focus was placed on delivering food or aid to 
“Rwandan” refugees (see, for example, Lorch, New York Times 02 May 1994). Of the 
Rwandan UOAs referring to the international community, 40.4 per cent warned against 
intervention or suggested caution, while 33.1 per cent called for intervention through 
diplomacy, and only 26.5 per cent called for military intervention. These findings enhance 
Robinson’s theory of empathy framing by providing evidence that if a group receiving 
empathy framing is not clearly identified, then military intervention is still not likely to be 
promoted. 
Furthermore, while some empathy framing was identified for Rwandans in general, 
similarities between the “victims” and the reader were very rarely promoted. In fact, despite 
empathy framing of victims, more than half of the references to Rwandans in general also 
contained negative characteristics. Rwandans were framed as “victims”, but they were 
portrayed as their own victims, and not worthy of intervention. This study also found zero 
similarities between the Tutsi population and the reader represented in Western media at the 
time. While Robinson categorised framing as either empathy or distance, Rwanda appears to 
have received both – empathy in the general description of “victims”, but distancing in the 
description of actor’s characteristics. This can be understood as a shallow form of “pity” in 
media framing of “native” ethnic conflicts, victims are pitied in general but individual actors 
are distanced from the reader, and little is done to promote intervention. 
This study also found that in the case of Kosovar Albanians and the East Timorese victims, 
the West was framed as the “hero”. The role of the international community as a hero, 
righteous in their intervention to assist in a barbaric situation, was evident in coverage of both 
conflicts – where the international community’s participation was represented as that of 
“promoting peace”. In the intervention into East Timor, the Australian-led forces were framed 
as the heroes, with media reports at the time suggesting that through military intervention, 
Australia could be “potential saviours of the East Timorese, agents of democracy and human 
rights able to overpower those bent on killing and destruction” (Orford, 2003: 10). This study 
found that a significant increase in support for intervention was portrayed in the media a 
month prior to troops landing in East Timor, as well as an increase in calls for intervention in 
Kosovo shortly before NATO attacked Serbian forces. In Kosovo the international 
community was represented as promoters of peace (with 77 per cent of their representation 
falling under this category) and in East Timor the international community was again hailed 
as defenders of democracy (with 59 per cent of representation falling under “promoting 
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peace”). The international community was regularly portrayed as promoters of peace in the 
Rwandan situation as well (50 per cent of representations), however the lack of intervention in 
this conflict can be explained by the lack of establishment of other “characters” – the hero 
was there, but not the identifiable victim or villain. 
These findings corroborate theorists’ suggestion that there is a necessity for a hero and victim 
narrative to be established in Western media in order for international military intervention to 
be supported (Walzer, 2004: 71; Fein, 2000; Barkawi, 2004: 115). Both heroes and victims 
were established in media reports of Kosovo and East Timor, which were represented as cases 
worthy of intervention, while Rwanda (a case that did not receive military intervention) 
lacked a clear, identifiable, one-sided victim. However, this study showed that even more 
significant in its impact on support for intervention is not the hero and victim, but the villain.  
6.6 Villains Wanted: Identifying the “Bad Guy” 
One area in which this study’s findings add to the literature is in measuring the impact of 
Western media labelling a “villain” within ethnic conflicts. The findings showed that the 
identification of a villain is more significant than the establishment of a hero and victim in 
media representations of cases worthy of intervention. The theoretical argument that public 
support of intervention requires a “good guys/bad guys model” (Walzer, 2004: 71) and 
victim/victimiser rhetoric, was evident in media coverage of the three conflicts included in 
this study. Both of the situations in Kosovo and East Timor were portrayed as worthy of 
intervention, and coverage of these conflicts focused heavily on a clearly identifiable villain: 
the “Side As” – Slobodan Milosevic and his Serbian forces in Kosovo and the Indonesian 
government in East Timor. Side A’s leaders and military were clearly portrayed as possessing 
negative characteristics, above and beyond their role in conflict, establishing a villain for 
audiences to unify against. The Serbian forces, as Side A military, were represented 
overwhelmingly as perpetrators, with 74 per cent of references made to roles in the conflict 
labelling them as the aggressors, while Indonesian forces were portrayed as aggressors in 60 
per cent of references to roles in the conflict.  
In Rwanda the situation was far more blended. It was the Tutsi forces who received a higher 
percentage of “aggressor” references, with 36.7 per cent, and the Hutu forces receiving 28.8 
per cent. The international community’s failure to recognise the atrocities occurring in 
Rwanda can be understood using Fein’s theory: that for genocide to be recognised, it requires 
“an innocent victim and guilty perpetrator” (2000: 50). This study supports Fein and other 
theorists’ suggestion that delays in international intervention are a result of failing to identify 
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a clear perpetrator who needs to be punished (Walzer, 2004: 71; Fein, 2000; Barkawi, 2004: 
115).  
The effect of representation of a villain on support for different kinds of intervention is also 
worth noting, with this study showing an interesting relationship between the two. This thesis 
found that mention of “victims” prompted more calls for diplomatic intervention, while 
references to “aggressors” produced a significantly higher proportion of calls for military 
intervention. Increased suggestions for full military intervention were made in cases with a 
stronger identification of a perpetrator – a clearer identification of a villain corresponded with 
a greater number of calls for the international community to step in. Of articles which 
discussed “victims”, 52.4 per cent suggested diplomatic intervention, and a weaker 37.2 per 
cent contained calls for military intervention. Within articles mentioning “aggressors”, 47.7 
per cent contained calls for military retaliation, and a lesser 29.7 per cent suggested 
diplomatic intervention. This study therefore shows that while an identification of a victim is, 
as theorists have suggested, important for mobilising public support for intervention (see 
Barkawi, 2004; Orford, 2003; Robinson, 2000), it is the recognition of a clear “villain” which 
prompts the strongest suggestions for full military intervention. 
6.7 Location, Location, Location 
This study posed the final sub question: Do the media frames used to represent conflicts 
differ, depending on the geographic location of the conflict, or the geographic location of the 
news in which they appear? This study found that the answer, to the first part of the question, 
is yes.  
Much of previous intervention literature has focused on the lack of intervention into African 
conflicts (Kuperman, 2000b; Dowden, 2004) . This reluctance to intervene in battles in Africa 
has been attributed to several factors. A failed intervention into Somalia in the early 1990s left 
a bad taste in the international community’s collective mouth, and is understood to have 
contributed to hesitation over intervention into later African conflicts (Livingston, 2007: 189; 
Kuperman, 2000b; Clarke and Herbst, 1996). However, African nations suffer from a much 
broader non-intervention bias that does not apply to other parts of the world. The argument by 
Mill and others that “native” battles are better left alone appears to apply to the global media’s 
understanding of African conflicts. 
The non-intervention approach taken by the international community to conflicts in Africa 
relies on the promotion of the view that these battles stem from “irrational, age-old hatreds” 
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(Jacquin-Serdal, 1998: 128), and are unable to be assisted by outside intervention. Several 
theorists have challenged this assumption over the past decade, and the non-intervention 
justifications it produces in policy have been criticised (see Tang, 2011; Ray, 2008; Terzis, 
2008; Kuperman, 2004; Jacquin-Serdal, 1998; Brown et al, 1997; Ignatieff, 1998; Turton, 
1997). This thesis contributes to that growing field, as these findings reveal that Rwanda was 
indeed represented as a war resulting from ‘ancient hatreds’, perhaps explaining (although in 
no way excusing) the non-intervention policy taken by the international community.  
Africa again stands out as an exception to the rule regarding theories of intervention and 
refugees. While some theorists (see Dowty and Loescher, 1996) suggest that increased 
international intervention into ethnic conflicts can be justified as attempts to stem refugee 
flows (and therefore maintaining regional peace and security), it would appear that this excuse 
is only used in select conflicts. Reports of the Rwandan conflict referred to a massive refugee 
exodus regularly and yet did not prompt increased calls for intervention. When refugees from 
Kosovo were widely reported on, however, the situation was different, with this study 
recording increased calls for intervention under the excuse of stopping the region from 
becoming embroiled in international conflict. Eastern Europe, and its neighbouring allies to 
the West, was deemed worthy of intervention under the refugee clause, while Africa was not.  
The impact of the geographical location of the conflict on Western media also goes some way 
in answering the final sub question of this thesis: Why are some ethnic conflicts depicted as 
barbaric (and warranting intervention) and some as native (and not worthy of intervention)? 
The findings of this study suggests that African conflicts are more likely to be depicted as 
“native” battles better left alone, while ethnic conflict in other parts of the world are portrayed 
as “barbaric” situations with the potential for intervention. The results of this study highlight a 
need for broader investigation into “why” African conflicts are viewed differently. 
When it comes to the geographical location of the newspapers involved, this study found little 
difference in the representation of ethnic violence and intervention. During the worst of the 
Rwandan conflict, the UK, USA and Australian newspapers all covered more suggestions for 
non-intervention than intervention. All three carried the voices of advocates for the internal 
parties to “sort it out themselves”, rather than calling for international intervention. The only 
area in which a difference between the newspapers was perceptible was in The Sydney 
Morning Herald’s preference for a diplomatic solution in East Timor, over a military 
intervention, which could possibly be explained by Australia’s trade relationship with 
Indonesia or Australia’s responsibility to lead and contribute heavily to an intervention. The 
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otherwise uniform approach to the case studies suggests that media in the UK, USA and 
Australia portray ethnic conflict in a similar fashion. 
6.8 Summary of Conclusions 
This study found that ethnic conflict is portrayed in one of two ways in Western media: either 
as a “barbaric” situation in which the West must intervene; or as a “native” battle better left 
alone. This study also showed that suggestions of intervention in Western media are 
significantly linked with the identification of “characters” participating in the conflict. Both 
the conflict in Kosovo and the violence in East Timor were found to be portrayed as 
“barbaric” situations, with an obvious hero/victim/villain narrative, and in need of 
intervention. The conflict in Rwanda, however, was represented as a “native” conflict and was 
not represented as worthy of intervention. Unlike the good guys/bad guys framework found in 
media coverage of Kosovo and East Timor, Rwanda was portrayed as a morally neutral battle 
between ethnic groups, with heavy reference to “tribal” stereotypes.  
The international community’s reluctance to intervene in Rwanda may be partly attributed to 
the failure to identify specific victims, and an obvious villain. While Kosovo and East Timor 
received proximate and empathy framing concerning the specific “victims” involved, the 
Rwandan people were only generally framed as “victims”. This study found that a lack of 
identifiable “characters” in media coverage of Rwanda corresponded with a lack of support 
for international intervention into the violence occurring. This thesis also found that not only 
do mainstream media narratives rely on a hero/victim framework in order to support 
intervention, as proposed by recent political literature (Orford, 2003; Fein, 2000; Barkawi, 
2004), but that the identification of a “bad guy” is the key to prompting the most media 
support for full military intervention. The West, it would appear, requires a clear “victim” and 
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